United States v. McKenna
791 F. Supp. 1101 (1992)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a district court lacks jurisdiction to grant an extension of time for filing a motion for a new trial if the request for that extension is made after the initial 7-day period following the verdict has expired, as this time limit is jurisdictional.
Facts:
- Dwight McKenna was prosecuted for making false statements on his income tax returns.
- The government called McKenna's accountant, Michael Bruno, as a witness against him.
- At the time of the trial, Bruno's accounting firm was still employed by and performing work for McKenna and his newspaper.
- During cross-examination, McKenna's defense counsel attempted to use leading questions with Bruno.
- The trial judge prohibited the use of leading questions unless counsel could first establish that Bruno was a hostile or adverse witness.
- The judge clarified that the scope of cross-examination was not limited, only the mode of questioning.
- In response to the court's ruling, defense counsel chose to rest their case entirely without cross-examining Bruno.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States prosecuted Dwight McKenna in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for making false statements on tax returns.
- On February 15, 1992, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on two counts.
- Within the 7-day period allowed by Rule 33, McKenna timely filed a motion for an extension of time to file a motion for a new trial.
- The court granted the motion, giving McKenna an additional 14 days.
- On March 9, 1992, the final day of the first extension, McKenna filed a second motion for an extension of time.
- The court granted the second motion, extending the deadline by another 10 days to March 19, 1992.
- On March 19, 1992, McKenna filed his Motion for New Trial.
- The Government filed a Motion to Dismiss McKenna's motion as untimely and therefore outside the court's jurisdiction.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a district court have jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to grant a second extension of time to file a motion for a new trial when the request for that second extension is made after the initial 7-day post-verdict period has already elapsed?
Opinions:
Majority - Schwartz, Jr., District Judge
No. A district court lacks jurisdiction to extend the time for filing a motion for a new trial unless the extension is fixed within the original 7-day period following the verdict. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 plainly states that a motion for a new trial must be made within 7 days, or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. Rule 45(b) explicitly prohibits the court from extending this time except under the conditions stated in Rule 33. The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Brown confirms that this 7-day period is jurisdictional, meaning the court is powerless to act once it has expired. Here, the defendant's request for a second extension was made on March 9th, well after the original 7-day period had passed, rendering the court's grant of that extension void for lack of authority. The defendant cannot claim detrimental reliance on the court's erroneous order, as the error was initiated by counsel's own untimely motion. Notwithstanding this jurisdictional defect, the motion for a new trial also fails on the merits. A trial court has broad discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c) to control the mode of interrogation, including prohibiting leading questions when cross-examining a friendly witness. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not the right to conduct it in whatever manner the defense wishes. By merely controlling the form of the questions, and not the scope of inquiry, the court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
Analysis:
This decision serves as a critical reminder of the strict, jurisdictional nature of deadlines under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It illustrates that certain procedural time limits, like the 7-day rule for new trial motions, are absolute and cannot be waived or extended by the court after they expire, even if the court mistakenly attempts to do so. This creates a bright-line rule that prioritizes finality and procedural regularity over judicial discretion or equitable considerations like 'detrimental reliance' on a court's error. The opinion also reinforces the distinction between the constitutionally protected scope of cross-examination and the trial court's discretionary control over the mode of questioning, affirming that reasonable limits on the use of leading questions do not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.
