United States v. McCoy
235 F. Supp. 3d 427 (2017)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The underlying substantive offense of robbery requires the use or threat of force, and an agreement to commit such an offense inherently involves a substantial risk that physical force will be used.
Facts:
- Earl McCoy and Matthew Nix allegedly conspired to obstruct commerce by robbing individuals of diamonds, watches, money, and drugs.
- As part of their alleged plan, McCoy and Nix used and carried firearms.
- The men were accused of attempting two separate Hobbs Act robberies.
- They were also accused of successfully committing one Hobbs Act robbery.
- McCoy and Nix were also alleged to have participated in a narcotics distribution conspiracy.
- Both McCoy and Nix were previously convicted felons and were charged with unlawfully possessing firearms.
Procedural Posture:
- The U.S. Government obtained a Third Superseding Indictment against Earl McCoy and Matthew Nix in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York.
- In advance of trial, McCoy and Nix filed several pretrial motions.
- McCoy and Nix each filed a motion to dismiss Count 2 of the indictment, which charged them with use of a firearm during a crime of violence.
- Defendants argued that the underlying offense for Count 2, Hobbs Act conspiracy, does not qualify as a 'crime of violence' under federal law.
- Defendants also moved to dismiss other counts and for a severance of their trials.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a 'crime of violence' under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), thereby serving as a predicate offense for a charge of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)?
Opinions:
Majority - Wolford, J.
Yes, a conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a 'crime of violence.' The court, applying the categorical approach, determined that since the substantive offense of Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, a conspiracy to commit it is as well. The court relied on binding Second Circuit precedent from cases like United States v. Hill, which held that a Hobbs Act robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under both the 'force clause' (§ 924(c)(3)(A)) and the 'risk-of-force clause' (§ 924(c)(3)(B)). The court reasoned that Hill did not disturb earlier precedent holding that a conspiracy to commit such a crime is itself a crime of violence because it inherently involves a substantial risk that physical force will be used. The court also distinguished the 'risk-of-force' clause from the ACCA's residual clause struck down in Johnson II, noting the § 924(c) clause is narrower, easier to construe, and not unconstitutionally vague.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the prevailing view within the Second Circuit that Hobbs Act conspiracy remains a valid predicate 'crime of violence' for § 924(c) charges, even after the Supreme Court's vagueness ruling in Johnson II. It illustrates the continued application of the categorical approach and demonstrates a lower court's adherence to binding circuit precedent. The ruling solidifies the distinction between the unconstitutionally vague ACCA residual clause and the constitutionally sound 'risk-of-force' clause in § 924(c)(3)(B), ensuring that prosecutors retain a key tool for charging defendants involved in violent criminal conspiracies.
