United States v. Matlock
415 U.S. 164 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
The voluntary consent of a third party to a warrantless search is valid against an absent, nonconsenting co-occupant if the third party possesses common authority over the premises. The government can prove such common authority by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing, where the strict rules of evidence do not apply.
Facts:
- William Matlock was a suspect in a federally insured bank robbery in Wisconsin.
- Matlock lived in a house leased by the Marshall family, sharing a single bedroom on the second floor with the Marshalls' daughter, Gayle Graff.
- On November 12, 1970, law enforcement officers arrested Matlock in the yard in front of the house.
- The officers did not ask the arrested Matlock for his consent to search the room he occupied.
- After the arrest, three officers went to the door of the house and were admitted by Gayle Graff.
- Graff told the officers that she and Matlock jointly occupied the east bedroom on the second floor.
- Graff voluntarily consented to a search of the house, including the bedroom she shared with Matlock.
- During the search of the bedroom's only closet, officers found $4,995 in cash inside a diaper bag.
Procedural Posture:
- William Matlock was indicted for bank robbery in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
- Matlock filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his room.
- The District Court held suppression hearings and granted the motion to suppress, finding the government failed to prove the consenting party had actual authority to consent because it excluded her out-of-court statements as inadmissible hearsay.
- The United States (the appellant) appealed the suppression order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling.
- The United States (the petitioner) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a third party's voluntary consent to a warrantless search of a shared living space validate the search against an absent, nonconsenting co-occupant if the third party has common authority over the premises?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes. The voluntary consent of a third party who possesses common authority over premises is valid against an absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. The Court's reasoning is that common authority rests on mutual use and joint access or control for most purposes, which means the co-occupant has assumed the risk that the other might permit a search of the common area. This authority is not based on technical property law, as established in cases like Stoner v. California. The lower courts erred by excluding as hearsay Mrs. Graff's out-of-court statements that she shared the bedroom with Matlock. The rules of evidence, particularly the hearsay rule, do not apply with full force in pretrial suppression hearings before a judge, who must determine the admissibility of evidence. The government's burden is to prove common authority by a preponderance of the evidence, and the excluded statements, including Matlock's own admissions and Graff's statements against her penal interest, should have been considered.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
No. The warrantless search was unconstitutional because the officers had ample time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant and failed to do so. The dissent argues that the key finding was the District Court's determination that no exigent circumstances existed to justify bypassing the warrant requirement. The Fourth Amendment's protection consists in requiring that inferences of probable cause be drawn by a 'neutral and detached magistrate,' not by officers in the field. Citing Johnson v. United States, the dissent emphasizes that mere inconvenience to officers is not an exception to the warrant requirement, and allowing such a search provides a substitute for the hated general warrants that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
No. A person's consent to a search is not a valid waiver of Fourth Amendment rights unless the person knew they had the right to refuse consent. The dissent argues that a person cannot meaningfully waive a constitutional right without ever being aware of its existence, restating the position from his dissent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. Therefore, the case should be remanded not only to determine if Mrs. Graff had common authority, but also to determine if she knew she could refuse the officers' request to search.
Analysis:
This case solidified the 'common authority' doctrine as the standard for third-party consent searches, shifting the focus from property law to the practical realities of shared living spaces. It established that cohabitants assume the risk that one of them will permit a search, thereby lowering the privacy protection for individuals in shared residences. Furthermore, the decision significantly impacted criminal procedure by clarifying that the strict rules of evidence, like hearsay, do not apply in suppression hearings, giving judges greater latitude in considering evidence to determine its admissibility at trial. The ruling also set the burden of proof for the prosecution at such hearings to a preponderance of the evidence, rather than a higher standard.
