United States v. Mary Dangerfield Bengivenga
845 F.2d 593, 1988 WL 44160, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 7002 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A suspect is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Facts:
- On February 1, 1986, Border Patrol Agents Santana and Ramos stopped a commercial bus at a fixed checkpoint in Falfurrias, Texas.
- Mary Dangerfield Bengivenga and her companion told Agent Santana they were traveling to Alice, Texas.
- Agent Santana then inspected the luggage compartment and detected a strong marijuana odor from three suitcases, which were also tagged for Alice.
- The agents observed Bengivenga and her companion peering nervously out the bus window during the luggage inspection.
- Agent Ramos boarded the bus and asked Bengivenga and her companion to 'please' step off for further questioning.
- The agents escorted the women and the suspicious suitcases to a nearby checkpoint trailer.
- Inside the trailer, Agent Ramos requested Bengivenga's bus ticket. When she opened her ticket envelope, Ramos saw three baggage claim stubs inside.
- Ramos asked for the stubs, matched them to the tags on the suitcases, and discovered twenty-four kilograms of marijuana inside.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Dangerfield Bengivenga was charged in federal district court with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
- Bengivenga filed a pretrial motion to suppress her statements, bus ticket, baggage claim stubs, and the marijuana, which the district court denied.
- Following a trial, a jury found Bengivenga guilty.
- Bengivenga, as appellant, appealed her conviction to a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The appellate panel reversed the conviction, finding the district court erred in denying the suppression motion.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the government's petition for a rehearing en banc, which vacated the panel's decision.
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Issue:
Does questioning a bus passenger in a border patrol checkpoint trailer, after agents have developed suspicion that she is smuggling drugs, constitute 'custodial interrogation' requiring Miranda warnings?
Opinions:
Majority - Clark, Chief Judge
No, the questioning did not constitute custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. A person is in custody only when their freedom of movement is restrained to the degree of a formal arrest. This court abandons its prior four-factor test for determining custody and adopts an objective 'reasonable person' standard. A routine checkpoint stop, like a traffic stop, is not custodial because it is brief, public, and not 'police dominated.' Even when suspicion focused on Bengivenga and she was moved to the checkpoint trailer, the situation did not become custodial because the location was a short distance from the bus, the bus driver was present, the number of officers did not increase, and a reasonable person would perceive the detention as temporary. Alternatively, even if a Miranda violation occurred, the bus ticket and baggage stubs are non-testimonial physical evidence and thus are not subject to suppression. Furthermore, the derivative evidence rule (fruit of the poisonous tree) does not apply to a mere Miranda violation, only to an actual constitutional violation like a coerced confession, which did not occur here.
Concurring - Rubin, Circuit Judge
Concurs with the result and the majority's reasoning regarding the custody determination, but does not join Part III of the opinion, which discusses the alternative grounds related to non-testimonial evidence and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Dissenting - Goldberg, Circuit Judge
Yes, the questioning was custodial interrogation. While agreeing with the adoption of the objective reasonable person standard, the dissent argues the majority misapplied it. Bengivenga was in custody from the moment she entered the checkpoint trailer. At that point, the hallmarks of custodial coercion identified in Miranda—privacy and the prospect of indefinite interrogation—were present. The situation was no longer public, and a reasonable person suspected of drug smuggling would fear prolonged detention. The dissent also argues that the act of producing the ticket and stubs was itself testimonial, as it provided the incriminating link between Bengivenga and the luggage, and this act occurred within an inherently coercive environment.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for formally abandoning the Fifth Circuit's four-factor custody test in favor of the objective 'reasonable person' standard, aligning the circuit's doctrine with Supreme Court precedent like Berkemer v. McCarty. It clarifies that a Fourth Amendment seizure, such as a checkpoint stop, is not automatically equivalent to Fifth Amendment custody for Miranda purposes. The ruling also narrows the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule by holding that it does not compel the suppression of non-testimonial physical evidence obtained from a suspect, nor does a mere Miranda violation trigger the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine without evidence of actual coercion.
