United States v. Marquez
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126014, 207 F.Supp. 3d 715, 2016 WL 4944876 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
Passive resistance, such as refusing to follow a federal officer's directive to move a vehicle, does not satisfy the element of 'force' required for a conviction of forcibly resisting an officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) unless accompanied by some measure of active, physical, or threatening conduct.
Facts:
- Nicanor Marquez and a passenger, Enrique Benavides, drove a pickup truck to a U.S. Border Patrol checkpoint on Interstate Highway 35.
- When questioned by Border Patrol Agent Ronald Burgos, Marquez and Benavides refused to answer immigration-related questions.
- Agent Burgos directed Marquez to move his truck to a secondary inspection area.
- In response to the directive, Marquez shifted the truck's transmission into the 'park' position and refused to move, blocking the primary inspection lane.
- A supervising agent, Richard Zelner, arrived and informed Marquez he would be arrested if he did not move the truck.
- Marquez continued to refuse to answer questions or move his vehicle.
- The entire encounter lasted between four and five minutes.
- When Agent Zelner declared Marquez under arrest and agents moved to remove him from the truck, Marquez offered no physical resistance to being handcuffed and taken into custody.
Procedural Posture:
- Nicanor Marquez was charged by criminal information in the United States District Court with one misdemeanor count of forcibly resisting a federal law enforcement officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).
- Marquez filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the criminal information pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1).
- Marquez argued in his motion that his undisputed actions did not satisfy the statutory element of 'force'.
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Issue:
Does passively refusing to move a vehicle from a primary inspection lane at a border checkpoint, without engaging in any physical struggle or making threats, constitute 'forcibly' resisting or impeding a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)?
Opinions:
Majority - Diana Saldaña
No, passively refusing to move a vehicle does not constitute 'forcibly' resisting an officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). The statute requires more than mere passive non-compliance; the term 'forcibly' must be interpreted as having a legal meaning distinct from its 'physics or engineering sense' and implies a level of active, violent, or threatening conduct. The court distinguished Marquez's conduct from cases involving physical struggles, such as in United States v. Williams, where defendants actively fought against officers. The court found Marquez's actions were akin to the passive resistance described in the United States v. Cunningham 'locked door' hypothetical—creating an inanimate obstacle—rather than the threatening human barrier in Lovgren v. Byrne. Because Marquez did not use violent force, make threats, or physically struggle when arrested, his passive refusal to move his truck did not meet the statutory requirement of 'force.' Therefore, the government cannot establish the requisite element of force based on the undisputed facts.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the meaning of 'forcibly' under 18 U.S.C. § 111 within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction, establishing that passive non-compliance alone is insufficient for a conviction. By distinguishing between active, physical resistance and passive refusal to cooperate, the court narrows the statute's scope and raises the evidentiary bar for prosecutors in cases involving uncooperative but non-violent individuals. This ruling provides a clearer line for law enforcement and prosecutors in determining when mere obstruction crosses into forcible resistance, likely impacting charging decisions in similar encounters at federal checkpoints and elsewhere. It reinforces the principle that criminal statutes with terms like 'force' will be interpreted to require a qualitative element of violence or threat, not just any physical action that causes an obstruction.
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