United States v. Marion

Supreme Court of United States
404 U.S. 307 (1971)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protection does not apply to the period before a person is formally accused of a crime, which occurs upon indictment, information, or actual arrest. The primary safeguard against pre-accusation delay is the applicable statute of limitations, supplemented by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for delays that cause substantial prejudice and are intentionally used by the government to gain a tactical advantage.


Facts:

  • Between March 15, 1965, and February 6, 1967, appellees operated Allied Enterprises, Inc., a home improvement business.
  • The business was alleged to have been conducted fraudulently, involving misrepresentations, alteration of documents, and nonperformance of contracts.
  • On February 6, 1967, the Federal Trade Commission issued a cease-and-desist order against Allied Enterprises.
  • In October 1967, newspaper articles reported that the U.S. Attorney's office was investigating fraudulent home improvement firms and specifically mentioned Allied Enterprises.
  • In the summer of 1968, at the request of the U.S. Attorney's office, Allied Enterprises provided certain business records to the government.
  • During this period, appellee Marion was also interviewed at the U.S. Attorney's office regarding his conduct as an officer of the company.

Procedural Posture:

  • On April 21, 1970, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging the appellees with 19 counts of fraud in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
  • Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the three-year delay between the end of the alleged criminal scheme and the indictment violated their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
  • The District Court judge granted the motion and dismissed the indictment for 'lack of speedy prosecution,' presuming the delay had prejudiced the defense.
  • The United States, as the appellant, appealed the dismissal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, with the business owners as appellees.

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Issue:

Does the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial apply to the period between the commission of an alleged crime and the filing of a formal indictment, where the indictment is filed within the applicable statute of limitations?


Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice White

No. The Sixth Amendment's speedy trial provision has no application until the defendant becomes an 'accused,' which occurs only upon formal indictment, information, or actual arrest. The court reasoned that the plain language of the amendment, protecting 'the accused' in 'criminal prosecutions,' signifies that its protections are activated only after formal proceedings have begun. The purposes of the guarantee—to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimize anxiety from public accusation, and limit impairment of defense—are primarily engaged by the restraints of arrest or the formality of an indictment. The court held that for pre-accusation delays, the primary protection is the statute of limitations. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment offers a limited safeguard, but only if a defendant can show both that the delay caused actual, substantial prejudice to their defense and that the government intentionally delayed the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage.


Concurring - Mr. Justice Douglas

No. While concurring in the result to reverse the dismissal, this opinion disagreed with the majority's bright-line rule that the Sixth Amendment has no application before indictment or arrest. The concurrence argued that the harms protected by the speedy trial right, such as fading memories and the anxiety of public accusation, can be just as severe during a lengthy pre-indictment investigation. Historical English common law, which influenced the framers, recognized that unreasonable pre-accusation delays could bar a prosecution. However, in this particular case involving complex fraud, the three-year delay was not necessarily excessive on its face. Therefore, the dismissal was premature, and the case should proceed, allowing the appellees an opportunity on remand to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay.



Analysis:

This case establishes a clear, bright-line rule for when the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right attaches: at the moment of indictment, information, or arrest. It clarifies the distinct roles of the Sixth Amendment, statutes of limitation, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause in policing prosecutorial delay. By limiting the Sixth Amendment's reach, the decision grants prosecutors significant discretion in timing indictments within the statutory period, free from speedy trial challenges for investigatory delays. This holding significantly increases the burden on defendants challenging pre-indictment delay, requiring them to meet the stringent two-prong due process test of actual prejudice and improper government motive.

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