United States v. Marcus
560 U.S. ____ (2010) (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For an appellate court to correct a plain error not raised at trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), the appellant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings, not merely that there was any possibility, however remote, of an effect.
Facts:
- Glenn Marcus engaged in conduct involving forced labor and sex trafficking between January 1999 and October 2001.
- The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), the federal statute criminalizing this specific conduct, became law on October 28, 2000.
- A portion of Marcus's alleged conduct occurred before the TVPA was enacted and was therefore not illegal under that particular statute.
- The indictment charged Marcus with a course of conduct that spanned the entire period, both pre- and post-enactment of the TVPA.
- At trial, the government presented evidence of Marcus's actions covering the full period from 1999 to 2001.
- The trial judge did not instruct the jury that it could not convict Marcus based solely on his conduct that occurred before October 28, 2000.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Glenn Marcus for forced labor and sex trafficking.
- Marcus was tried and convicted by a jury on both charges in the U.S. District Court (the trial court).
- At trial, Marcus's counsel did not object to the jury instructions or raise the issue of the statute's effective date.
- Marcus, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- On appeal, Marcus argued for the first time that the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on the statute's effective date, creating a risk of conviction for pre-enactment conduct.
- The Second Circuit vacated the conviction, holding that a new trial is required if there is 'any possibility' a jury convicted based exclusively on pre-enactment conduct.
- The United States, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Second Circuit's decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an appellate court's plain error review require reversal whenever there is any possibility, however remote, that a jury convicted a defendant based exclusively on conduct that occurred before the criminalizing statute was enacted?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
No. The Second Circuit's standard, which requires reversal for 'any possibility' of an improper conviction, is inconsistent with this Court's established four-part plain error test. To satisfy the third prong of the plain error rule, an appellant must show that the error affected their substantial rights, which ordinarily means demonstrating a 'reasonable probability' that the error affected the trial's outcome. The 'any possibility' standard is irreconcilable with this prejudice requirement. Furthermore, this type of instructional error is not a 'structural error' that would presumptively affect substantial rights. The error also fails the fourth prong, as a tiny risk of an improper conviction basis is unlikely to seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed because the error was sufficiently severe to warrant a new trial. The trial error created a substantial risk that the jury convicted Marcus for conduct that was not criminal when it occurred. Beyond that, allowing the government to characterize pre-enactment conduct as illegal distorted the jury's perception of all the evidence and may have tipped the scales in favor of conviction. This error prejudiced Marcus and undermined the integrity of the proceedings. The majority's rigid four-part test is an 'analytic maze' that frustrates sound judicial discretion, and the Court of Appeals properly exercised its authority to remedy a fundamental unfairness.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms and strengthens the Supreme Court's stringent four-part test for plain error review established in United States v. Olano. By rejecting the Second Circuit's more lenient 'any possibility' standard, the Court solidifies the high bar defendants must clear to have an unpreserved error corrected on appeal, requiring a showing of actual prejudice. The decision clarifies that even errors with constitutional dimensions, such as a potential due process violation from a conviction for non-criminal conduct, are not automatically considered 'structural' and are subject to the same rigorous prejudice analysis. This holding limits appellate court discretion and forces a case-specific inquiry into whether an error likely changed the outcome, rather than allowing for automatic reversal for certain categories of errors.
