United States v. Manske
186 F.3d 770 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A witness's prior acts of intimidating other witnesses are probative of their character for truthfulness under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated when a court completely prohibits cross-examination aimed at exposing a witness's potential bias, such as fear of another key witness, especially when the government's case relies heavily on witness testimony.
Facts:
- Between 1993 and 1996, Stephen Pszeniczka and Daniel Knutowski alleged that Thomas Manske was their primary supplier of cocaine, delivering one to two ounces to them nearly every Wednesday.
- The government's case against Manske was based almost entirely on the testimony of Pszeniczka, Knutowski, and a few other witnesses; there was no physical evidence such as surveillance recordings, seized cocaine, or traced money.
- Manske testified that his weekly meetings and phone calls with Pszeniczka and Knutowski were related to illegal sports betting and bookmaking, not drug trafficking.
- In previous, unrelated judicial proceedings, Pszeniczka had a history of intimidating potential witnesses to prevent them from testifying truthfully against him.
- Pszeniczka's threats included telling one person, 'if you don't change your statement you might as well be dead,' and telling another he would 'put a cap in your head.'
- Manske's defense theory was that Pszeniczka fabricated the drug conspiracy allegations and that other witnesses, like Mary Colburn and Jackie Campbell, corroborated the story out of fear of Pszeniczka.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government indicted Thomas D. Manske in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, a federal trial court.
- Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine to prohibit Manske's defense from cross-examining government witnesses about key witness Stephen Pszeniczka's prior acts of witness intimidation.
- The district court granted the government's motion, ruling the evidence was inadmissible under FRE 608(b) and irrelevant to witness bias.
- Following a jury trial, Manske was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
- Manske, as the defendant-appellant, appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a district court commit reversible error when it prohibits a defendant from cross-examining a key government witness about their prior acts of witness intimidation, and also bars cross-examination of other witnesses about their potential bias stemming from fear of that same key witness?
Opinions:
Majority - Flaum, Circuit Judge
Yes. The district court committed reversible error by improperly limiting the defendant's cross-examination rights. The court adopted a 'middle view' of Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), holding that acts of witness intimidation are highly probative of a witness's character for truthfulness because they demonstrate a willingness to subvert the legal process for personal advantage. The district court's error was in narrowly construing these threats as being probative only of a tendency for violence, when they are more fundamentally about dishonesty. Furthermore, the court's complete ban on questioning other witnesses about their potential fear of Pszeniczka violated Manske's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right to expose witness bias. Because the government's case was devoid of physical evidence and rested entirely on the credibility of these witnesses, these errors were not harmless and collectively undermined confidence in the jury's verdict, necessitating a new trial.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of FRE 608(b) in the Seventh Circuit, establishing that conduct aimed at subverting the judicial process, like witness intimidation, is directly probative of a witness's character for truthfulness. It moves beyond a narrow view that only considers acts of overt falsehood (like perjury) and embraces acts of general dishonesty. The case also powerfully affirms that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to expose witness bias is a core trial right, and a complete prohibition on exploring a plausible theory of bias, such as fear, constitutes constitutional error. This precedent is particularly significant in 'he-said, she-said' cases where witness credibility is the central issue, making it harder for trial courts to restrict such cross-examination and for appellate courts to deem such restrictions harmless error.
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