United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Products, Inc.

Majority - Boyce F. Martin, Jr.

No, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the federal prosecution because the fines levied by the local agency and the federal indictment represent actions by independent sovereigns, and the federal charges under the Clean Air Act and CERCLA constitute separate offenses requiring differing elements of proof. Furthermore, Double Jeopardy protections do not extend from a Subchapter S corporation to its employees or shareholders. The court first addressed the claim by Presidential, Huff, and Marrillia that Subchapter S corporate structure extended double jeopardy protection to them. The court clarified that Subchapter S is merely a taxing statute (26 U.S.C. § 1361 et seq.) and does not confer unique double jeopardy protection to employees or shareholders, as double jeopardy protection is "intrinsically personal." Therefore, the federal prosecution against Presidential, Huff, and Marillia is not a "second prosecution" for them. Regarding Louisville Edible's argument under United States v. Halper (1989) that the local fines were punitive and thus barred federal prosecution, the court rejected this claim based on the dual sovereignty doctrine, citing Heath v. Alabama (1985). The Double Jeopardy Clause bars only additional prosecution by the same sovereign. The Jefferson County Air Pollution Board, deriving its jurisdiction from state law (Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 77.005 et seq.), operates as a "separate sovereign" from the federal government, even though federal law (42 U.S.C. § 7416) authorizes state development and enforcement of emissions standards. Thus, the federal prosecution by the United States and the prior actions by the state-derived Air Pollution Board do not trigger double jeopardy. The court also dismissed Louisville Edible's contention, citing Bartkus v. Illinois (1959), that the Air Pollution Board acted as a "tool" for federal enforcement. A review of documents showed the Board rejected several Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommendations, including deferring prosecution, and engaged in inter-sovereign dialogue, indicating independent action. The EPA also lacked statutory authority to control the local board's actions. Finally, addressing Louisville Edible's argument under Grady v. Corbin (1990) that the Clean Air Act and CERCLA claims were for the same conduct and thus barred, the court clarified that Grady bars successive prosecutions for the same offense, not simultaneous prosecutions for separate offenses. The court applied the "same elements" test from Blockburger v. United States (1932). A Clean Air Act conviction requires proving emission of asbestos or violation of work practice standards (42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)), while a CERCLA conviction requires proving responsibility for a hazardous substance release and failure to immediately notify the appropriate agency (42 U.S.C. § 9603). Since each offense requires proof of an element the other does not, they are separate offenses and can be prosecuted simultaneously without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.