United States v. Loud Hawk
88 L. Ed. 2d 640, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 42, 474 U.S. 302 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to the period after a district court dismisses an indictment unless the defendant is subject to actual restraints on liberty. Any delay caused by interlocutory appeals is evaluated under the four-factor balancing test established in Barker v. Wingo.
Facts:
- On November 14, 1975, acting on an FBI tip regarding federal fugitives, Oregon state troopers stopped two vehicles.
- A chase and gunfire followed, leading to the capture of several individuals, including respondents Kenneth Loud Hawk and Russ Redner. Respondent Dennis Banks was apprehended on January 26, 1976.
- Searches of the vehicles uncovered 350 pounds of dynamite, partially assembled time bombs, ammunition, and various firearms.
- Following their standard policy, Oregon law enforcement officers destroyed the dynamite, though a federal agent photographed the explosions and dynamite wrappers were preserved.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondents were indicted by a federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on November 25, 1975.
- The District Court granted respondents' motion to suppress evidence concerning destroyed dynamite on March 31, 1976.
- The District Court then dismissed the indictment with prejudice after the Government answered 'not ready' for trial.
- The Government, as appellant, appealed the suppression order and the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- On August 7, 1979, the Ninth Circuit reversed both the suppression order and the dismissal, reinstating the charges against the respondents, the appellees.
- Following re-indictment, the District Court granted a motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution for one respondent on August 8, 1980; both sides appealed.
- On July 29, 1982, the Ninth Circuit ruled in the Government's favor on all issues.
- On remand, the District Court dismissed the indictment again on May 20, 1983, this time on the grounds that the 90-month delay violated respondents' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
- The Government appealed this speedy trial dismissal to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision on August 30, 1984.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
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Issue:
Does the time during which an indictment against a defendant is dismissed and the defendant is not subject to restraints on liberty, combined with delays from interlocutory appeals by both the government and the defendant, violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No, the delays in this case did not violate the respondents' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to periods when defendants are neither under indictment nor subject to actual restraints on their liberty, such as incarceration or bail conditions. Following United States v. MacDonald, once the indictment was dismissed and respondents were freed, they were in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation, and the speedy trial clock stopped. For the periods of delay caused by interlocutory appeals, the court applied the four-factor Barker v. Wingo balancing test. The court found that the 90-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, but the other factors weighed against the respondents' claim. The reasons for delay were largely legitimate government appeals where the government's position was strong, or delays caused by the respondents' own frivolous motions and appeals. Furthermore, respondents failed to demonstrate significant prejudice from the delay.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes, the delays violated the respondents' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The majority misapplies United States v. MacDonald because, unlike in MacDonald, the government never dropped the charges but actively pursued prosecution through appeal, meaning respondents remained formally 'accused' throughout the process. Furthermore, respondents could have had restraints imposed on their liberty at any time during the appeals, which is a key distinction. The majority also errs in its Barker analysis by failing to weigh the unreasonable delay caused by the appellate court itself against the government. The ultimate responsibility for delays caused by 'overcrowded courts' must rest with the government, not the defendant, and the five years the Court of Appeals took to resolve these pretrial appeals was patently unreasonable.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the temporal scope of the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause by establishing a clear 'off-the-clock' period. The ruling holds that the constitutional speedy trial guarantee is not implicated when an indictment is dismissed and the defendant is free from actual restraints, even if the government is actively appealing that dismissal. It solidifies the flexible Barker v. Wingo balancing test as the proper framework for analyzing delays from interlocutory appeals, giving the government substantial latitude to pursue such appeals without automatically triggering a speedy trial violation. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to succeed on speedy trial claims based on appellate delay, requiring them to show bad faith by the prosecutor or unreasonable prejudice.
