United States v. Lorenzo Jesus Mejia-Alarcon

Majority - Ebel

1. No, a conviction for unauthorized acquisition and possession of food stamps, committed by trading goods, does not qualify as a "crime of dishonesty or false statement" under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) for impeachment purposes. 2. Yes, an objection to the admission of a prior conviction can be preserved for appeal solely through a definitive pretrial motion in limine without renewing the objection at trial. 3. No, a district court's failure to explicitly ascertain on the record whether a defendant voluntarily and knowingly consented to a stipulation admitting an essential element of the crime does not constitute plain error or a due process violation under these circumstances. The court held that the district court erred in admitting Mejia's prior conviction for unauthorized acquisition and possession of food stamps under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). Rule 609(a)(2) narrowly defines "dishonesty and false statement" to include only crimes involving an element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification (crimen falsi), such as perjury, fraud, or false pretense, as indicated by the Conference Committee Report. Mejia's act of trading chrome pick-up truck wheels for food stamps, while illegal, did not involve an element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification that would bear on his propensity to testify truthfully, unlike crimes such as making false claims or issuing bad checks with knowledge of dishonor. The court clarified that while it can look beyond the elements of an offense, the facts of Mejia's prior conviction did not establish deceit. However, the error was harmless under Kotteakos v. United States because the conviction had modest impeachment value, was not related to the current drug and weapons charges, and the evidence of Mejia's guilt was substantial. The court also established a three-part test for when a pretrial motion in limine can preserve an objection for appellate review without renewal at trial: (1) the issue is adequately presented to the district court, (2) the issue is of the type that can be finally decided in a pretrial hearing (akin to a question of law), and (3) the trial judge rules upon it unequivocally. Mejia's motion in limine to exclude the food-stamp conviction satisfied these criteria, thus preserving his objection. Regarding the stipulation as to the identity and weight of the heroin, the court found no plain error in the district court's failure to explicitly ascertain on the record whether Mejia voluntarily and knowingly consented. While such an inquiry is preferred, the Tenth Circuit has held that such a failure does not constitute plain error or violate due process where the defendant was present, represented by counsel, did not object, and does not allege the stipulation was involuntary in fact (citing United States v. Herndon). The court rejected Mejia's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, stating that such claims are generally inappropriate on direct appeal unless the record is sufficiently complete. Mejia's claims failed because his counsel adequately preserved the objection to the prior conviction via the motion in limine, and the admission of the conviction was harmless. Further, no adequate predicate (like an involuntary stipulation) was alleged for an ineffective assistance claim regarding the stipulation.