United States v. Lopez
662 F.Supp. 1083, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5565 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
An act of prison escape, if successfully defended as a necessity, is considered a justified act rather than an excused one. Therefore, a third party cannot be held criminally liable for aiding and abetting a justified act because no underlying crime was committed by the principal.
Facts:
- Ronald McIntosh, a federal prisoner, disappeared on October 28, 1986, during an unescorted transfer.
- On November 5, 1986, McIntosh piloted a helicopter into the recreation yard of F.C.I. Pleasanton.
- McIntosh flew away from the prison with another inmate, Samantha Lopez.
- Ten days later, federal authorities apprehended both McIntosh and Lopez in a Sacramento shopping mall as they were purchasing wedding rings.
- Lopez alleged that she escaped due to threats of imminent death or serious bodily injury she faced while in prison.
Procedural Posture:
- Samantha Lopez was charged with escape from federal custody in U.S. District Court.
- Ronald McIntosh was indicted in the same court for air piracy, use of a weapon to commit a crime, and aiding and abetting Lopez's escape.
- The government filed a motion in limine seeking an order to prevent the defendants from presenting evidence supporting a necessity/duress defense.
- In response, both Lopez and McIntosh filed written offers of proof with the court, arguing they had sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the defense.
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Issue:
Is a defendant criminally liable for aiding and abetting a prison escape if the principal escapee is found not guilty because the escape was justified by necessity?
Opinions:
Majority - Lynch, District Judge
No. A defendant cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting a prison escape if the principal's escape is justified by necessity, because a justified act is not a wrongful act and therefore no underlying crime has been committed. The court distinguishes between justification defenses, where an act is deemed lawful and not wrongful because it avoids a greater societal harm, and excuse defenses, where an act is wrongful but the actor is not held culpable due to a personal condition like insanity. Aiding a justified act is permissible, whereas aiding an act that is merely excused can still result in liability for the aider. The court classifies the necessity defense for prison escape as a justification, reasoning that the escapee is making the correct choice to violate the law to avoid the greater harm of death or serious injury. Consequently, if a jury finds Lopez's escape was justified by necessity, she committed no criminal offense. As there can be no aiding and abetting liability without an underlying crime, McIntosh cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a justified, non-criminal act.
Analysis:
This case provides a critical clarification on accomplice liability by hinging it on the theoretical distinction between justification and excuse defenses. By classifying the necessity defense for prison escape as a justification, the court establishes that a successful necessity plea by the principal nullifies the underlying crime, thereby precluding any conviction for aiding and abetting. This precedent protects third parties who assist others in escaping imminent and severe harm. However, the ruling also carefully limits the scope of the rescuer's own necessity defense, requiring that each of their independent criminal acts (e.g., air piracy, use of a weapon) must also be proven to be necessary with no reasonable legal alternative, preventing the defense from becoming a blank check for committing additional crimes.
