United States v. Lindemann
85 F.3d 1232 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires proof that the defendant could reasonably foresee the use of interstate wires in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, but it does not require proof that the defendant specifically foresaw the interstate nature of those communications.
Facts:
- George Lindemann, Jr. was a partial owner of a show horse named 'Charisma,' which was insured for $250,000.
- On December 13, 1990, Barney Ward called Tommy Burns in Chicago and told him he could earn money by killing a horse in New York for a man named 'Lindemann.'
- Burns then called a travel agent in New York from his location in Chicago to book a flight.
- On December 15, 1990, at the Lindemann family's 'Cellular Farms,' Lindemann's horse trainer, Marion Hulick, told Burns that 'George' wanted the horse killed while he was in Asia.
- Hulick informed Burns the insurance policy was for $250,000 and that Burns would receive ten percent of the proceeds.
- Hulick then identified Charisma as the target and showed Burns a back road to enter the farm undetected that night.
- At approximately 10:00 p.m., Burns returned to Cellular Farms and electrocuted Charisma in its stall.
- Following the horse's death, Lindemann filed an insurance claim and instructed employees to lie to investigators to ensure the claim would be paid.
Procedural Posture:
- George Lindemann, Jr. was tried in the U.S. District Court.
- A jury found Lindemann guilty on three counts of wire fraud.
- Lindemann (appellant) appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 require the government to prove that the defendant reasonably foresaw the interstate nature of the wire communications used in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme?
Opinions:
Majority - Cummings, Circuit Judge
No, a conviction for wire fraud does not require proof that the defendant foresaw the interstate nature of the calls. The wire fraud statute contains two elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the use of a wire communication in furtherance of that scheme. To satisfy the second element, the government must prove that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that wire communications would be used to advance the scheme, and that the communications that were actually made were interstate in nature. The court reasoned that the 'interstate nexus' is a jurisdictional element required by the Commerce Clause, not a substantive element of the crime's wrongfulness. The defendant’s criminal intent (mens rea) need only apply to the fraudulent scheme itself, not to the jurisdictional fact of whether the wires crossed state lines. Therefore, as long as Lindemann could foresee that his co-conspirators would use telephones to arrange the killing, he is liable for wire fraud because those calls were in fact interstate. The court also held that co-conspirator statements identifying Lindemann were admissible under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) without a showing of the declarants' personal knowledge, as required by FRE 602, because there was sufficient independent evidence to establish a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the important distinction between a crime's substantive elements and its jurisdictional elements in federal law. It clarifies that for wire fraud, the defendant's intent does not need to extend to the interstate nature of the communication. This lowers the evidentiary burden on prosecutors, making it easier to secure convictions in fraudulent schemes that happen to use interstate wires, even if the scheme's mastermind did not specifically plan for or know about the interstate connection. The ruling aligns the mens rea requirement for wire fraud with other federal offenses where the jurisdictional hook is treated as a strict liability component.
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