United States v. Lincoln Plowman
2012 WL 5846243, 700 F.3d 1052, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23822 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is not entitled to an entrapment defense if they fail to provide sufficient evidence of government inducement. Inducement is not established where the government merely provides an opportunity to commit a crime, the bribe offered is not extraordinary, and the defendant is a willing participant who is the first to suggest a corrupt payment.
Facts:
- Lincoln Plowman was an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department major and an elected member of the Indianapolis-Marion County City-County Council.
- As Chairman of the Metropolitan Development Committee, Plowman held influence over zoning matters and appointed members to the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA).
- The FBI initiated a sting operation where an undercover agent, 'Mark,' posed as a businessman wanting to open a strip club in Indianapolis.
- During their first meeting on August 11, 2009, Plowman was the first to suggest a corrupt payment, stating Mark could 'throw me some money' in exchange for political influence to navigate zoning issues.
- On August 26, 2009, Plowman specified a payment of '$5,000 [in] cash, and a $1,000 check made out to [Plowman’s] campaign fund' to 'schmooze' his political allies on the BZA.
- Over several months, Plowman actively worked to find a suitable property for the club and discussed using his influence over his BZA appointees to secure a necessary zoning variance.
- On December 22, 2009, in a videotaped hotel room meeting, Plowman accepted $5,000 in cash from Mark, promising to '[t]ake care of the people that we need to take care of.'
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Lincoln Plowman on one count of federal-funds bribery and one count of attempted extortion under color of official right.
- Prior to trial in the U.S. District Court, the government filed a motion in limine to preclude Plowman from presenting an entrapment defense.
- The district court granted the government's motion.
- Following a trial, a jury found Plowman guilty on both counts.
- Plowman (appellant) appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing the district court erred by precluding his entrapment defense.
- The United States (appellee) argued the district court's decision was correct.
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Issue:
Does a government sting operation constitute inducement sufficient to allow a defendant to present an entrapment defense where an undercover agent merely provides an opportunity to accept a bribe, and the public official defendant is the first to suggest a corrupt payment and willingly participates in the scheme?
Opinions:
Majority - Manion, Circuit Judge
No. A government sting operation does not constitute inducement where the defendant fails to provide sufficient evidence that the government's actions went beyond simply offering an opportunity to commit a crime. The court found no evidence of inducement because: 1) The bribe of $5,000 was not an 'extraordinary' promise that would tempt a normally law-abiding person, and was less than amounts previously found insufficient for inducement. 2) The agent did not mislead Plowman into believing the act was legal; Plowman himself admitted he would use the money to 'schmooze' officials and line his own pockets. 3) The agent's persistence over five months was not coercive, especially compared to cases like Jacobson where the government contact lasted over two years. 4) Plowman was an active and willing participant, not an emotionally vulnerable target. Most importantly, Plowman was the instigator who first suggested the idea of a corrupt payment in his very first conversation with the agent.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the significant burden a defendant faces in raising an entrapment defense, particularly in the context of public corruption stings. It solidifies the principle that merely creating an opportunity for a predisposed individual to commit a crime does not constitute inducement. The court's emphasis on who initiated the discussion of illicit payment provides a clear factual benchmark for lower courts. By allowing the entrapment defense to be precluded pretrial via a motion in limine, the case affirms a procedural tool that can prevent meritless defenses from reaching a jury, thereby streamlining trials involving sting operations.
