United States v. Lei Shi

Majority - O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge

Yes, federal law (18 U.S.C. § 2280) grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts of violence on a foreign vessel in international waters, and the Due Process Clause does not require a specific jurisdictional nexus with the U.S. for such an application because the conduct constitutes piracy, a universally condemned crime. Furthermore, the statutory requirement that an offender be "later found" in the United States does not require voluntary entry. Congress's authority to enact § 2280 stems from the Offense Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 10), which empowers it to define and punish piracies on the high seas, as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18) in conjunction with the Executive's Treaty Power to implement international accords like the Maritime Safety Convention. The acts Shi committed—forcibly seizing control of a ship and acts of violence endangering navigation—fall within the traditional definition of piracy. Due process does not require a jurisdictional nexus for such universally condemned crimes because the global disapproval of the conduct provides sufficient notice to offenders that they may be prosecuted by any state where they are found, distinguishing it from cases involving less universally condemned crimes like drug trafficking. The statutory phrase "later found in the United States" means merely physical presence, regardless of whether the defendant's arrival was voluntary, as established by Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Frisbie v. Collins) and confirmed by other circuits interpreting similar statutes. Therefore, Shi's arrest and transport to Honolulu satisfied the jurisdictional requirements. The indictment against Shi was sufficient as it contained all elements of § 2280 and did not need to allege "terrorism," which is not an element of the crime itself. Shi's confession to Agent Torikai was admissible because any taint from his prior unwarned statements to Lt. Fu was sufficiently attenuated due to the passage of a full day, intervening circumstances (different interrogators, different locations, improved conditions), and the non-purposeful nature of Lt. Fu's misconduct. Shi's Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, aided by an interpreter and a Mandarin-written form, and he did not unambiguously invoke his right to silence. His confession was voluntary under the totality of circumstances, considering the reasonable time between arrest and arraignment and measures taken to ensure he understood his rights. The search warrant for Shi's bunk was valid; even if technically deficient, the good faith exception applied as the affidavit provided clear information. The warrant was not overbroad in its description of items, and its execution by agents not fluent in Chinese was reasonable, as identifying documents does not require language fluency. Finally, the district court's 36-year sentence was reasonable, as it correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines and carefully considered all 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including a downward departure based on Shi's history and unique circumstances.