United States v. Larry D. Cameron

Majority - Flaum, Circuit Judge

No, a district court does not err by precluding evidence of a government witness's prior drug use for general character impeachment, by refusing to admit a witness's misdemeanor conviction for switchblade possession as a 'crime of dishonesty,' by denying a defendant the right to introduce evidence of a co-conspirator's flight to imply the defendant's innocence, or by considering hearsay evidence about the extent of a conspiracy during sentencing when the defendant had an opportunity to rebut. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. Regarding the witness's prior drug use, the court held that while such evidence may be probative of a witness's 'possible inability to recollect and relate' if memory is legitimately at issue, there is a considerable danger of prejudice when offered solely for a general character attack. The trial court correctly balanced these concerns under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. As for the switchblade conviction, the court determined that state law characterizations of a crime as dishonest are not binding on federal courts. Looking to the elements of Michigan law, possession of a switchblade does not involve specific intent to deceive, which is the essential characteristic of 'crimes of dishonesty' as defined by Congress (e.g., perjury, fraud, embezzlement). Therefore, it is not probative of a witness's propensity to testify truthfully, and its exclusion was not an error under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a). The court also found no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation. Trial judges have broad discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. The restrictions imposed in this case were aimed at preventing a general character attack, not at preventing the defense from showing a motive to lie, as was the case in Davis v. Alaska. The defendant had ample opportunity to impeach the witness on other grounds, such as inconsistencies in his statements. Therefore, the defense was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to impeach. Concerning the co-conspirator's flight, the court acknowledged that a defendant's own flight can be evidence of consciousness of guilt, though it should be viewed with caution. However, the probative value of flight evidence is even more limited when it concerns a party other than the accused. Admitting such evidence would add little while introducing unjustified complexity and delay into the trial, making it inadmissible to infer the defendant's innocence. Finally, regarding the sentencing fine, the court reiterated that district courts have 'great latitude' in considering factors and may rely on evidence, including hearsay, not admissible at trial. However, the sentence cannot be based on inaccurate or improper factors or unconvicted crimes. Importantly, the defendant must be given an opportunity to rebut erroneous hearsay evidence. Here, the hearsay concerned the extent of the conspiracy, not a separate crime, and the defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the government agent. The trial court, recognizing the weakness of the evidence, made clear it would give it little weight, which was a permissible use of the evidence.