United States v. Larry Burdette Johnson
1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14468, 637 F.2d 1224, 6 Fed. R. Serv. 1264 (1980)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense jury instruction if there is an "inherent relationship" between the greater and lesser offenses, meaning they protect the same interests and proof of the lesser is generally presented in proving the greater, and if the evidence would permit a rational jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense while acquitting on the greater offense.
Facts:
- On April 22, 1978, Larry Burdette Johnson, Edwin Papse, Richard Johnson, and others were drinking alcoholic beverages in Blackfoot, Idaho.
- Later that day, the group went to Johnson's residence on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation.
- In the late evening or early morning, Johnson had an argument with his wife.
- Following the argument, Johnson allegedly struck Papse and Richard Johnson with the blunt end and handle of a long-handled ax.
- Papse slept at the house after the incident.
- The next day, Papse walked to a neighbor's home and was then transported to a hospital for treatment.
- At trial, Johnson testified that he only struck Papse once in the face with his fist and denied using an ax.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Burdette Johnson was charged in a federal district court with two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(f).
- At trial, Johnson's counsel requested jury instructions on three lesser included offenses: assault with a dangerous weapon, assault by striking, and simple assault.
- The trial judge refused to give the requested instructions.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count I (assault on Edwin Papse) and not guilty on Count II (assault on Richard Johnson).
- The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Johnson to ten years imprisonment.
- Johnson appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the trial court's refusal to give the lesser included offense instructions was an error.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to give a defendant's requested lesser included offense jury instructions when the lesser offenses are not strictly necessary components of the charged greater offense under a mechanical statutory comparison, but are inherently related based on the facts proven at trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Spencer Williams
Yes, the trial court committed reversible error. A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction if two conditions are met: the lesser offense is 'necessarily included' in the greater, and the evidence would allow a rational jury to convict on the lesser but acquit on the greater. The court rejects a mechanical, purely statutory comparison of elements to identify an included offense. Instead, it adopts the 'inherent relationship' test, which requires that the two offenses protect the same interests and are so related that proof of the lesser is generally part of the proof of the greater. Here, assault resulting in serious bodily injury and assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm both protect against assaults in federal jurisdictions, and the government's evidence of an ax attack to prove the greater offense also proved the elements of the lesser. Furthermore, a rational jury could have found the victim's injuries were not 'serious' (the distinguishing element), thus acquitting on the greater charge but convicting on the lesser. The trial court also erred by refusing to instruct on the petty offenses of simple assault and assault by striking, as Supreme Court precedent in Keeble mandates such instructions for Indian defendants even if the lesser offenses are not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act.
Analysis:
This decision formally adopts the 'inherent relationship' test for lesser included offenses in the Ninth Circuit, moving away from a rigid, element-by-element statutory comparison. This flexible, fact-based approach provides defendants with greater procedural protection against juries that might convict on a greater charge despite doubts, simply because they believe the defendant is guilty of 'some' crime. The ruling solidifies a circuit split on the issue and acknowledges potential complexities with its application to double jeopardy jurisprudence, which traditionally relies on the stricter 'Blockburger' test for comparing offenses.
