United States v. Lara
124 S. Ct. 1628, 72 U.S.L.W. 4277, 541 US 193 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
The Constitution grants Congress plenary power over Indian affairs, which includes the authority to lift or relax judicially recognized restrictions on the tribes' inherent sovereign authority, such as the power to criminally prosecute nonmember Indians. A tribal prosecution under such congressionally affirmed inherent authority is an act of a separate sovereign and thus does not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a subsequent federal prosecution.
Facts:
- Billy Jo Lara, an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, lived on the Spirit Lake Reservation with his wife, who was a member of the Spirit Lake Tribe.
- After several instances of misconduct, the Spirit Lake Tribe issued an order excluding Lara from its reservation.
- Lara disregarded the exclusion order and remained on the reservation.
- When federal officers stopped him for ignoring the order, Lara struck one of the officers.
- The Spirit Lake Tribe, of which Lara was not a member, prosecuted him in its tribal court for 'violence to a policeman.'
- Lara pleaded guilty to the tribal charge and served a 90-day jail sentence.
Procedural Posture:
- The Federal Government charged Billy Jo Lara in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota with assaulting a federal officer.
- Lara moved to dismiss the charge, arguing it was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause due to his prior conviction in the Spirit Lake Tribal Court for the same conduct.
- A Federal Magistrate Judge rejected Lara's double jeopardy claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel's decision, holding that the tribal prosecution was an exercise of delegated federal power and that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the subsequent federal prosecution.
- The United States sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar the federal government from prosecuting a nonmember Indian for an offense when the tribe has already prosecuted him for the same conduct, following a congressional statute that recognizes the tribe's inherent authority to do so?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the federal prosecution because the prior tribal prosecution was an exercise of the tribe's own inherent sovereignty, which Congress constitutionally recognized and affirmed, not an exercise of delegated federal power. The Constitution grants Congress broad, plenary powers regarding Indian tribes, stemming from sources like the Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause. This authority allows Congress to both impose and relax restrictions on tribal sovereignty. The Court's prior holding in Duro v. Reina, which found tribes lacked inherent jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, was a statement of federal common law based on the legal circumstances at the time, not a permanent constitutional limit on congressional power. By passing a statute to 'recognize and affirm' the tribes' 'inherent power' to prosecute all Indians, Congress validly adjusted the tribes' status and lifted the restriction identified in Duro. Therefore, the Spirit Lake Tribe acted as a separate sovereign, the dual sovereignty doctrine applies, and the subsequent federal prosecution is permissible.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars the federal prosecution because the tribe's power to prosecute a nonmember is not inherent; it could only have been delegated by Congress, meaning both prosecutions derive from the same sovereign source. Precedent such as Duro v. Reina and South Dakota v. Bourland established that the loss of inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is a constitutional consequence of the tribes' dependent status. Congress cannot legislatively 'reinvest' a tribe with an inherent power that the Court has determined it does not constitutionally possess. The statute should be interpreted as a delegation of federal power to fill the jurisdictional void left by Duro, not a restoration of inherent sovereignty. Because the tribe's prosecution was an exercise of delegated federal power, the tribe and the federal government are not separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes, and the second prosecution is barred.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the federal prosecution. The inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes has an ancient historical basis, predating that of most States. Given that Congress can authorize States to exercise powers that the Constitution might otherwise prohibit, it is not exceptional that Congress can also relax restrictions on an ancient, inherent tribal power.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause argument must fail, but the majority's reasoning is troubling. Congress made its intent clear that it was recognizing 'inherent' tribal power, not delegating federal power. For the purpose of a double jeopardy analysis, the Court should take Congress at its word, making the tribe a separate sovereign. However, the majority's broader holding—that the Constitution authorizes Congress to subject a U.S. citizen to the jurisdiction of a third sovereign outside the federal-state structure—is a serious and doubtful proposition. The proper time to challenge Congress's power to do this was during the initial tribal proceeding, which Lara failed to do.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
No. While the Court's tribal sovereignty jurisprudence is deeply confused and contradictory, the double jeopardy claim fails under existing precedent. The statute cannot be read as a delegation of federal prosecutorial power to tribal officials who are outside the President's control, as this would raise grave separation-of-powers issues. Therefore, the statute must be read as a recognition of inherent power, making the tribe a separate sovereign. The Court’s prior decisions like Duro were exercises in federal common law reflecting federal policy, which the political branches have now authoritatively changed. The time has come to reexamine the flawed premises of federal Indian law, particularly the source of Congress's purported plenary power over tribes.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Congress's role as the primary arbiter of the scope of tribal sovereignty. It establishes that judicial determinations limiting inherent tribal powers, such as in Duro v. Reina, are effectively federal common law pronouncements that are subject to legislative revision. By framing Congress's action as 'relaxing restrictions' rather than delegating power, the Court provides a mechanism for Congress to legislatively restore tribal jurisdiction that the judiciary has curtailed. This significantly shifts the balance of power between the branches in defining tribal authority and affirms a broad view of congressional power in Indian affairs.
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