United States v. Lanier
520 U.S. 259 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for depriving a person of a constitutional right requires fair warning, which is met if the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent in light of pre-existing law. This standard is the same as the 'clearly established' standard used for qualified immunity in civil rights cases.
Facts:
- From 1989 to 1991, David Lanier was the sole state Chancery Court judge for two rural counties in western Tennessee.
- While in office and in his judicial chambers, Lanier sexually assaulted five different women.
- The victims included two of his secretaries, a Youth Services Officer for the juvenile court he presided over, and a federal program coordinator.
- Another victim was a woman whose divorce had come before Lanier and whose daughter's custody remained under his jurisdiction.
- During a supposed job interview, Lanier sexually assaulted and orally raped this woman after mentioning he might reexamine her daughter's custody.
- A few weeks later, Lanier lured the same woman back to his chambers under a false pretext of another job opportunity and again sexually assaulted and orally raped her.
Procedural Posture:
- David Lanier was indicted in U.S. District Court on eleven counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 242.
- The District Court denied Lanier's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds of vagueness.
- A jury convicted Lanier on seven counts, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years in prison.
- Lanier, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where a three-judge panel initially affirmed the convictions.
- The Sixth Circuit vacated the panel's decision and granted a rehearing en banc.
- The en banc Court of Appeals, as the intermediate appellate court, reversed Lanier's convictions, holding that he lacked fair warning because no Supreme Court case had applied the right at issue to a 'fundamentally similar' factual situation.
- The United States, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242 require a higher standard of fair warning, specifically a prior Supreme Court decision with 'fundamentally similar' facts, than the 'clearly established' standard used for qualified immunity in civil cases?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Souter
No. Criminal liability under § 242 does not require a higher standard of fair warning than the 'clearly established' standard from civil qualified immunity doctrine. The Sixth Circuit's requirement that a constitutional right must be identified in a Supreme Court decision with 'fundamentally similar' facts is an erroneously high standard. The proper due process inquiry for 'fair warning' in a § 242 prosecution is identical to the 'clearly established' test for qualified immunity in § 1983 civil suits: whether the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct was 'apparent' in light of pre-existing law at the time of the offense. A general constitutional rule can apply with 'obvious clarity' to specific conduct, even if that particular conduct has not been the subject of a prior judicial holding. Therefore, decisions from Courts of Appeals, not just the Supreme Court, can provide the necessary fair warning, and fact patterns need not be 'fundamentally similar' for the law to be considered clearly established.
Analysis:
This decision harmonizes the standard for notice in criminal civil rights prosecutions (§ 242) with the standard for qualified immunity in civil rights lawsuits (§ 1983). By rejecting the Sixth Circuit's extremely high 'fundamentally similar facts' test, the Court ensured that state officials cannot escape criminal liability for egregious constitutional violations simply because no prior case involved the exact same conduct. It clarifies that broadly established constitutional principles, like the right to bodily integrity, can provide sufficient 'fair warning' that conduct like sexual assault by a state official is illegal. This lowers the barrier for prosecutors in § 242 cases and reinforces that officials are expected to understand how general legal principles apply to their specific actions.
