United States v. Lake
150 F.3d 269 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
For the purposes of the federal carjacking statute, a vehicle is taken from the "person or presence" of a victim if it is so within the victim's reach, observation, or control that the victim could have retained possession of it were they not overcome by violence or fear.
Facts:
- Hilton A. Lake was at Little Magen's Bay beach and approached Milton Clarke, repeatedly asking to borrow Clarke's car.
- Clarke's car was parked on a road at the top of a steep hill, out of sight from the beach.
- After Clarke refused, Lake showed Clarke a gun, put it to his face, and demanded the car keys.
- Clarke's friend, Pamela Croaker, arrived on the beach; Lake then approached her and demanded her car keys.
- Lake showed Croaker the gun and, after a brief struggle, pointed it near her head, causing her to surrender the keys to her car, which was also parked out of sight up the hill.
- Lake ran up the path to the parking area and drove away in Croaker's car.
- Croaker and Clarke pursued Lake up the path but only arrived as he was driving away.
- Police later apprehended Lake in the stolen car; he claimed the gun was a toy, but the gun was never recovered.
Procedural Posture:
- Hilton A. Lake was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands for carjacking and using a firearm during a crime of violence.
- At the close of evidence at his jury trial, Lake moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied.
- The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the carjacking charge but guilty on the firearms charge.
- The district court entered a judgment of conviction on the firearms offense and sentenced Lake to 60 months imprisonment.
- Lake (appellant) appealed the conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does taking a vehicle that is parked out of the victim's sight satisfy the federal carjacking statute's requirement that the vehicle be taken 'from the person or presence of another' when the perpetrator takes the keys from the victim at gunpoint and the victim's fear prevents them from immediately pursuing the perpetrator to stop the taking?
Opinions:
Majority - Alito
Yes. Taking a vehicle under these circumstances satisfies the 'from the person or presence' element of the carjacking statute. The court adopts the definition of 'presence' used in other federal robbery statutes, which holds that property is in a person's presence if it is so within their reach, observation, or control that they could have retained possession of it if not overcome by violence or fear. Here, a rational jury could infer that Croaker hesitated to pursue Lake up the path due to the fear induced by Lake pointing a gun at her. Had she not been fearful and hesitated, she could have reached the parking area in time to prevent Lake from taking her car. This fear-induced inability to exercise control over the nearby vehicle is sufficient to place the vehicle within her constructive 'presence' for the purposes of the statute. The court also rejected Lake's other arguments, finding sufficient evidence that the gun was real, that he had the conditional intent to cause serious harm, and that the vehicle had been in interstate commerce.
Dissenting - Becker
No. The taking of the car does not satisfy the 'from the person or presence' requirement of the carjacking statute. The plain meaning of 'presence' does not extend to a car that is, in city terms, a block away and out of sight. The majority's test proves too much; its logic would imply that if a victim could have followed a perpetrator across the island, the property was still in their 'presence,' rendering the statutory language meaningless. This case involves a key robbery and grand larceny of a car, not a carjacking. The dissent also notes that this case strengthens the argument that the federal carjacking statute is an unconstitutional overreach of Congress's Commerce Clause power, as most carjackings are local crimes, not part of an interstate enterprise.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the definition of 'presence' for the federal carjacking statute, moving beyond a requirement of immediate physical proximity or sight. By establishing a constructive presence test based on the victim's potential control absent fear, the court makes it easier to prosecute carjackings where the perpetrator first obtains the keys and then takes the vehicle from a nearby location. This ruling has been influential in interpreting the 'person or presence' element in robbery and carjacking cases, allowing for convictions even when the property is not in the victim's immediate vicinity at the moment of the taking. It solidifies the principle that the perpetrator's use of fear or violence is the key factor that bridges the physical distance between the victim and the property.
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