United States v. Jorn
400 U.S. 470, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 146, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971)
Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars retrial of a defendant when a trial judge declares a mistrial sua sponte, without the defendant's consent, unless there is a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial. An abrupt declaration made without considering less drastic alternatives, such as a continuance, fails to meet this standard.
Facts:
- The defendant, Jorn, was charged with willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax returns for several taxpayers.
- At trial, the government called the taxpayers whom Jorn had allegedly assisted as its primary witnesses.
- After the first witness was called, defense counsel suggested that the witnesses be warned of their constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
- The trial judge, after questioning the first witness, expressed disbelief that the IRS had adequately warned the witnesses of their rights.
- The judge refused to allow the first witness to testify until he had consulted with an attorney.
- Upon learning that the other prosecution witnesses were in a similar situation, the judge questioned the prosecutor about his trial strategy.
- Without affording either the prosecutor or defense counsel an opportunity to object or suggest alternatives, the judge discharged the jury and aborted the trial to allow the witnesses to consult with lawyers.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government charged Jorn in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah with assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax returns.
- A jury was chosen and sworn, and the trial commenced.
- During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the trial judge declared a mistrial on his own motion.
- Before a new trial began before a second jury, Jorn filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the information on the ground of former jeopardy.
- The District Court judge granted Jorn's motion and dismissed the case.
- The Government filed a direct appeal of the dismissal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar the retrial of a defendant when the trial judge, without the defendant's consent, abruptly declares a mistrial out of concern for prosecution witnesses, without considering less drastic alternatives?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes. Retrial is barred because the judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial was not justified by 'manifest necessity.' A defendant possesses a 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal,' which cannot be foreclosed unless the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. The 'manifest necessity' standard from United States v. Perez commands trial judges to exercise sound discretion and not abort proceedings without scrupulously considering other options. In this case, the trial judge acted abruptly and failed to consider alternatives, such as a continuance, which would have protected the witnesses' rights without depriving Jorn of his right to proceed with the first jury. The judge's motive to protect the witnesses does not override the defendant's significant interest in seeing the trial through, and therefore, the judge abused his discretion, triggering the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
No. A retrial should not be barred merely because the trial judge 'abused his discretion' in a way that did not prejudice the defendant. The core question for double jeopardy purposes is not whether the judge committed a procedural error, but whether there was an 'abuse of the trial process resulting in prejudice to the accused,' such as harassment or giving the prosecution a tactical advantage. Here, there is no evidence of judicial or prosecutorial misconduct intended to harm the defendant. The mistrial, declared out of a perhaps misguided concern for the witnesses, did not injure Jorn and may have even benefited him if the witnesses later chose not to testify. Barring a retrial in these circumstances serves as an 'injustice to the public' without vindicating any legitimate interest of the defendant.
Concurring - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
Yes. Although the result is a 'plain frustration' of the public's right to have the case tried, the record shows the erroneous mistrial was caused solely by the conduct of the trial judge. Since the defendant, Jorn, did nothing to bring about the mistrial, his claim falls within the 'classic mold' of being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, and retrial is therefore barred.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high standard of 'manifest necessity' required for a judge to declare a mistrial without the defendant's consent. It clarifies that a judge's good intentions are not sufficient; the judge must actively consider and exhaust less drastic alternatives before depriving the defendant of their 'valued right' to a verdict from the first jury. By focusing on the judge's abrupt action rather than motivation, the case strengthens protections against the emotional and financial strain of repeated prosecutions. This holding obligates trial courts to be more deliberate and create a clear record showing why a mistrial is the only viable option, thereby limiting judicial discretion in this area.
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