United States v. Jonathan Joseph Lincoln
403 F.3d 703, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 705, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5686 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A statement predicting or endorsing violence against the President by a third party does not constitute a 'true threat' under 18 U.S.C. § 871, even if the author has previously made separate, personal threats, so long as the statement itself disassociates the author from the threatened action.
Facts:
- While incarcerated, Jonathan Joseph Lincoln participated in anger management classes.
- In March 2001, Lincoln wrote statements in his anger management workbook threatening the life of President Bush and his family.
- In an April 2001 interview with Secret Service Agent Ronald Wampole, Lincoln detailed a plan to gather people upon his release to travel to Washington, D.C., and shoot the President.
- On September 24, 2001, approximately six months after the interview, Lincoln attempted to mail a letter to President George W. Bush.
- The letter stated, 'You Will Die too George W Bush real Soon They Promissed [sic] That you would Long Live BIN LADEN.'
- In the letter, Lincoln had crossed out words like 'us' and 'we,' replacing them with 'they' and 'them.'
Procedural Posture:
- Jonathan Joseph Lincoln was indicted in federal district court for one count of threatening the life of the President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871.
- Following a one-day bench trial, the district court found Lincoln guilty, initially considering both workbook writings and statements to an agent as context for the threatening letter.
- Before sentencing, the district court granted Lincoln's renewed motion to suppress the workbook writings based on an intervening appellate court decision.
- The district court nonetheless reaffirmed the conviction, holding that Lincoln's prior statements to the agent provided sufficient context to render the letter a true threat.
- Lincoln, the appellant, appealed the conviction and the denial of his motion for acquittal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a letter that, on its face, predicts the death of the President at the hands of a third party constitute a 'true threat' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871 when viewed in the context of the author's prior, separate statements expressing a personal intent to harm the President?
Opinions:
Majority - Rawlinson, Circuit Judge
No. A letter that predicts harm to the President by a third party is not transformed into a 'true threat' by the author's prior, unrelated expressions of intent to harm the President. The statute criminalizing threats against the President must be interpreted narrowly to protect speech under the First Amendment. The court determined that the letter itself was not a threat, as it attributed the action to an unidentified 'they' and explicitly disassociated Lincoln from the act through edits. The court distinguished this from cases like Planned Parenthood, where context (a pattern of posters followed by murders) gave an otherwise non-threatening statement a new, menacing meaning. Here, Lincoln's prior statements from six months earlier did not alter the literal meaning of his letter, which predicted, rather than personally threatened, harm. The letter was deemed crude and offensive political hyperbole, which is protected speech, rather than a true threat.
Analysis:
This decision refines the 'true threat' analysis by limiting the scope of what constitutes relevant 'context.' It establishes that a speaker's past threats do not automatically convert a present statement—which on its face attributes a threat to a third party—into a personal 'true threat.' The ruling reinforces a high bar for prosecuting speech, drawing a clear line between making a direct threat and merely endorsing or predicting violence by others. This protects political speech, even when it is offensive and disturbing, from being criminalized under threat statutes, ensuring that the First Amendment's protections remain robust.
