United States v. Johnson
457 U.S. 537 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A decision by the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment must be applied retroactively to all criminal convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered.
Facts:
- U.S. Secret Service Agents Hemenway and Pickering suspected Raymond Eugene Johnson of involvement with a misdelivered U.S. Treasury check.
- On May 5, 1977, the two agents went to Johnson's home without an arrest warrant.
- After Johnson entered his house, the agents drew their weapons, knocked, and identified themselves with fictitious names.
- When Johnson opened the door, he saw the agents with guns drawn and their badges raised.
- Johnson permitted the agents to enter the house.
- Inside the home, the agents interrogated Johnson, who then revealed his involvement in the check scheme.
- Following his oral confession, the agents formally arrested Johnson.
- Johnson later signed a written statement admitting his role.
Procedural Posture:
- Raymond Eugene Johnson was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California after his motion to suppress statements from his arrest was denied.
- A jury convicted Johnson of aiding and abetting obstruction of correspondence.
- Johnson, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which initially affirmed the conviction.
- While Johnson's petition for rehearing was pending before the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Payton v. New York.
- The Ninth Circuit then granted Johnson's petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and reversed the conviction, holding that Payton applied retroactively.
- The United States Government's petition for rehearing was denied by the Ninth Circuit.
- The United States Government, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the question of retroactivity.
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Issue:
Does a new Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest apply retroactively to a conviction that was pending on direct review and not yet final when the new rule was announced?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
Yes. A new Fourth Amendment rule of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new rule is decided. The Court adopts Justice Harlan's dissenting view that failing to apply a new rule to all non-final cases violates principles of treating similarly situated defendants alike and fulfilling the judicial duty to apply the current law. The rule from Payton v. New York was not a 'clear break with the past,' as the constitutionality of warrantless home arrests was already highly questionable based on long-standing Fourth Amendment principles protecting the sanctity of the home. Applying new rules retroactively in this context incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior in unsettled areas of law and avoids the arbitrariness of selectively applying new constitutional protections.
Dissenting - Justice White
No. A new extension of the exclusionary rule, such as the one in Payton, should not be applied retroactively. Under the precedent of United States v. Peltier, retroactivity is generally reserved for new rules that impact the truth-finding function of a trial, which the exclusionary rule does not. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct, a goal that is not served by retroactively punishing law enforcement for conduct that was permissible under the law at the time it occurred. The majority's new approach is just as arbitrary as the one it replaces, as it simply draws a line at a different point, and it needlessly abandons the Court's established, principled framework for analyzing retroactivity.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes. Justice Brennan joined the majority's opinion with the specific understanding that the holding is limited to cases pending on direct review. He clarifies that this decision does not disturb existing precedents that generally bar the retroactive application of new rules to convictions that have already become final and are being challenged on collateral attack.
Analysis:
This decision established a significant shift in the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence, specifically for Fourth Amendment cases. By adopting Justice Harlan's long-held dissenting view, the Court replaced the ad hoc, multi-factor Stovall test with a clear, bright-line rule for cases on direct appeal. This ruling promotes fairness and consistency by ensuring that defendants whose cases are not yet final receive the benefit of new constitutional protections. It simplifies the retroactivity analysis for lower courts and provides a stronger incentive for law enforcement to respect constitutional boundaries, even in legally unsettled areas.
