United States v. John Veysey
61 Fed. R. Serv. 1245, 334 F.3d 600, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12934 (2003)
Rule of Law:
The federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), applies to the arson of a single-family dwelling that is rented, as the rental of real estate constitutes an activity affecting interstate commerce, regardless of whether the owner is primarily engaged in the rental business. Expert statistical testimony, while probabilistic, does not inherently usurp the jury's function and is admissible, particularly when not the sole evidence and when objections to its methodology are waived.
Facts:
- In 1991, John Veysey set fire to his house, filed an inflated insurance claim, and received payment for the rebuilding.
- In 1992, Veysey married Kemp, increased the insurance on his house, removed valuable contents, cut a natural-gas line, and caused the house to explode, destroying it, then exaggerated the property loss and received insurance proceeds.
- The following year, Veysey attempted to kill Kemp by driving his van with her in it into a river, and when that failed, he killed her by poisoning, collecting $200,000 from life insurance policies on her.
- Veysey became engaged to Donner after meeting her through a personal ad but broke the engagement after failing to procure a $1 million life insurance policy on her life.
- In 1996, Veysey burned down his house again, submitted an inflated estimate of loss, and received substantial insurance proceeds.
- After marrying Beetle, Veysey moved into a rented house, and Beetle insured her life for $500,000 with Veysey as beneficiary.
- In 1998, Veysey drugged Beetle, set fire to their rented house, hoping to kill both her and their infant son (on whom he also had a life insurance policy), but they were rescued.
- After divorcing Beetle, Veysey persuaded Hilkin to move in with him after she accumulated approximately $700,000 in life insurance with him as the primary beneficiary, and he was arrested before he could carry out his apparent plan to murder her.
Procedural Posture:
- John Veysey was convicted after a jury trial in a federal district court for 16 separate counts of mail or wire fraud, one count of arson, and one count of felony by fire.
- The district court imposed a sentence of 110 years in prison, achieved by imposing the maximum sentence on each count and making them run consecutively.
- Veysey appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the federal arson statute (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)), which requires a building to be "used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce," apply to the arson of a single-family dwelling that is rented by an owner not primarily in the rental business, and is expert statistical testimony regarding the improbability of multiple fires occurring by chance admissible without usurping the jury's function?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, Circuit Judge
Yes, the federal arson statute (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)) applies to a single-family dwelling that is rented, as the real estate rental market is an activity affecting interstate commerce. Yes, expert statistical testimony, even with dramatic probabilities, is generally admissible, and in this case, the objection to its methodology was waived, and any error in its introduction was harmless due to overwhelming other evidence. The court affirmed Veysey's 110-year sentence, explaining that the federal sentencing guidelines directed the judge to impose maximum and consecutive sentences to achieve a total punishment equivalent to a life sentence, which was warranted given Veysey's extensive criminal conduct including murder, attempted murder, multiple arsons, and frauds. This aggregation of sentences did not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, as no individual sentence exceeded its statutory maximum. Veysey's claim for severance into multiple trials was deemed frivolous because his criminal acts were closely related and would have been admissible in separate trials to demonstrate intent, modus operandi, and the scope of his overall scheme to defraud. Regarding the federal arson statute, the court distinguished Jones v. United States, which held that arson of an owner-occupied home is not covered, from Russell v. United States, which held that arson of an apartment building consisting of rental units is covered. The court determined that the single-family rented house fell under the purview of Russell, reasoning that the real estate rental market is an interstate market, and the specific rental transaction was interstate (owner in a different state). The court rejected the need to inquire into the owner's motives for renting, stating that such an inquiry would complicate decision-making without offsetting gain. Concerning the actuary's testimony that the probability of four fires occurring by chance in Veysey's dwellings was one in 1.773 trillion, the court rejected Veysey's argument that such statistical evidence usurped the jury's function or should be inadmissible to establish an element of a crime. The court emphasized that "all evidence is probabilistic—statistical evidence merely explicitly so." It distinguished cases like Smith v. Rapid Transit, where "naked statistical evidence" alone was deemed insufficient, by noting that such cases often imply a failure of the plaintiff to conduct a proper investigation. Here, the statistical evidence supplemented overwhelming other evidence. The court acknowledged potential flaws in the actuary's methodology (e.g., unrealistic assumption of independence, limited reference group), but noted Veysey had waived these objections. Any error in the testimony's introduction was considered harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Veysey's guilt.
Analysis:
This case provides significant clarity on the interpretation of the federal arson statute's interstate commerce requirement, broadly applying it to any rented property, even single-family homes rented by an "accidental renter," thus expanding the statute's reach. It reinforces the principle that expert statistical evidence is generally admissible in federal courts, affirming that its probabilistic nature does not inherently usurp the jury's role, particularly when part of a larger evidentiary picture. The decision also serves as a strong reminder to litigants about the importance of timely and specific objections to expert methodology, as waiver can preclude later challenges, and highlights the judicial view that overwhelming non-statistical evidence can render any error in statistical testimony harmless.
