United States v. John M. Poindexter
1991 WL 235749, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 389, 951 F.2d 369 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
Under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 and the Fifth Amendment, the prosecution bears the heavy burden of proving that its evidence, including the testimony of its witnesses, is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the defendant's compelled immunized testimony; any use, including refreshing a witness's recollection, is prohibited. Furthermore, the term "corruptly" in the obstruction of Congress statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1505, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of making false statements to Congress.
Facts:
- In 1984, Congress passed the Boland Amendment, prohibiting U.S. intelligence agencies from providing military support to the Nicaraguan Contras.
- In 1985, National Security Council (NSC) staff, including Oliver North, began a plan to aid the Contras and also became involved in a plan to ship missiles to Iran.
- In December 1985, John M. Poindexter became the National Security Advisor and had knowledge of the continuing Contra support program and the Iran arms shipments.
- In July 1986, responding to a congressional inquiry, Poindexter sent letters to House committees which falsely stated that NSC staff actions were in compliance with the law.
- On August 6, 1986, Poindexter arranged a meeting at which Oliver North falsely denied giving military assistance to the Contras to Members of the House Intelligence Committee.
- In November 1986, after press reports about an arms-for-hostages deal, Poindexter had meetings with members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees where he allegedly made false statements regarding his knowledge of the 1985 Iran arms shipment.
- Soon after the November 1986 meetings, Poindexter destroyed a Presidential Finding document that described the Iran arms shipment as an exchange for hostages.
Procedural Posture:
- During a congressional investigation into the Iran-Contra Affair, John M. Poindexter was compelled to testify under a grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
- Subsequently, the Independent Counsel secured a five-count felony indictment against Poindexter in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- Poindexter moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing his immunized testimony was used before the grand jury; the district court denied the motion.
- The trial judge held pre-trial hearings to determine whether the testimony of proposed government witnesses was tainted by exposure to Poindexter's immunized testimony.
- Following a jury trial, Poindexter was convicted on all five counts.
- Poindexter appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the government violate 18 U.S.C. § 6002 and the Fifth Amendment by using testimony from witnesses whose recollections were admittedly refreshed or influenced by exposure to a defendant's widely-publicized, compelled, and immunized congressional testimony?
Opinions:
Majority - D.H. Ginsburg
Yes. The government violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights when it fails to prove that its trial evidence is wholly independent of the defendant's immunized testimony. The immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002, prohibits any prosecutorial use of compelled testimony, direct or indirect, which includes using it to refresh a witness's recollection or to shape, alter, or affect their testimony in any way. Here, the trial court applied a legal standard for 'use' that was too narrow. Key witness Oliver North was extensively exposed to Poindexter’s immunized testimony and could not say his own recollection was unaffected. Given North's immersion in the testimony, the Independent Counsel failed to meet its heavy burden under Kastigar v. United States to show that North's testimony was not tainted. This failure requires reversal of all convictions. Additionally, the convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are reversed on the separate ground that the term 'corruptly' is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of lying to Congress, because neither the statutory text, legislative history, nor case law provides adequate notice that such conduct is prohibited by that specific statute. However, the court rejects Poindexter's argument for a 'legislative function' exception to the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Dissenting - Mikva
No. The majority errs by refusing to remand the case to the district court for a proper hearing under the correct legal standard. This court recently clarified the scope of use immunity in United States v. North, and the trial court in this case should be given the opportunity to apply that new, stricter standard and determine whether the prosecution can meet its burden. The majority improperly usurps the trial court's role by deciding the factual issue of taint itself, especially since the trial judge found Oliver North's claim of an inability to segregate his memories to be 'totally incredible.' Furthermore, the majority's conclusion that § 1505 is unconstitutionally vague is incorrect; lying to Congress to obstruct its inquiry is a clear violation of a legal duty and falls within the common meaning of acting 'corruptly.' Poindexter's conviction on that count should be upheld.
Analysis:
This decision, along with its companion case United States v. North, significantly strengthened the protections of use immunity and created a high evidentiary barrier for prosecutors in cases involving immunized congressional testimony. It established that any influence of immunized testimony on a witness's memory, no matter how minor, constitutes a prohibited 'use,' making it exceptionally difficult to prosecute individuals after they testify publicly under an immunity grant. The ruling forces Congress to weigh the value of obtaining public testimony against the strong possibility of precluding a subsequent criminal conviction. The court's vagueness holding on § 1505 also narrowed a key obstruction statute, compelling prosecutors to use more specific statutes like § 1001 for charges related to lying to Congress.
