United States v. John E. McGee
1999 WL 682014, 189 F.3d 626 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), a party's own statement offered against them by an opponent is not hearsay and is admissible regardless of whether the statement is inculpatory or exculpatory.
Facts:
- On July 5, 1997, John McGee, Walter Williams, and Bridget Womack agreed to rob a bank.
- They drove to the North Shore Bank, where McGee went inside to survey the layout.
- McGee returned to the car and instructed Womack to go to a specific teller named Barbara.
- Womack entered the bank, passed a note to teller Barbara Meservey, received money, and left.
- Williams drove the group back to his residence, where McGee divided the stolen money among the three of them.
- On August 20, 1997, Detective Carl Buschmann interviewed McGee about the robbery.
- During the interview, McGee gave three different, inconsistent accounts of his actions on the day of the robbery but consistently denied any involvement.
- McGee signed a written version of his statement but first had the detective add the words, 'some of it is true'.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted John McGee on two counts of bank robbery in the United States District Court.
- Prior to trial, McGee filed a motion in limine to exclude his statement to police, arguing it was inadmissible hearsay because it was not inculpatory.
- The district court denied the motion, ruling the statement's inconsistencies made it inculpatory.
- After a trial, the jury found McGee guilty of Count 1 and not guilty of Count 2.
- McGee filed post-verdict motions for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence due to unbelievable witnesses and an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) regarding accomplice testimony.
- The district court denied both motions.
- McGee (appellant) appealed the judgment of conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the legality of the accomplice testimony, and the admission of his statement.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a defendant's own out-of-court statement, which is exculpatory on its face but inconsistent with other statements, inadmissible as an admission by a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) because it is not inculpatory?
Opinions:
Majority - Ripple, Circuit Judge
No. A defendant's statement is admissible as an admission by a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) as long as it is the party's own statement and is offered against that party; the rule does not require the statement to be inculpatory. The court reasoned that the plain language of Rule 801(d)(2)(A) contains no requirement that the statement be against interest or inculpatory. It simply requires that the statement is made by the party and is offered against them. The court aligned itself with other circuits and evidence treatises, holding that exculpatory statements, such as McGee's inconsistent denials, are admissible because their inconsistency can be used by the prosecution to suggest a consciousness of guilt. The court also rejected McGee's other arguments, holding that accomplice testimony obtained through plea agreements offering leniency does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), and that assessing witness credibility is the exclusive role of the jury, not the appellate court.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), bringing it in line with the prevailing view in other federal circuits. It clarifies that the admissibility of a party's own statement is not contingent on its content being incriminating. The ruling empowers prosecutors to introduce a defendant's inconsistent or false exculpatory statements to undermine their credibility and create an inference of guilt. This precedent significantly limits a defendant's ability to exclude their own prior statements from evidence, reinforcing the principle that nearly any statement by a party can be used against them at trial.
