United States v. John Dejohn
638 F.2d 1048, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 21290 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court may admit evidence of a defendant's 'other bad acts' under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to prove 'opportunity' if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, even if the defendant does not explicitly dispute the issue of opportunity. A defendant's knowledge that a check is forged can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and failure to give a specific presumption of innocence instruction is not reversible error if other instructions sufficiently cover the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.
Facts:
- John DeJohn lived at a YMCA in Chicago.
- Andy Spyropoulos, who owned a restaurant near the YMCA, cashed two United States Treasury checks for John DeJohn around December 23, 1977, and about a week later.
- The payees on the first check ($317) was Horace Palm, and on the second check ($311) was Timothy Lutes; both resided at the same YMCA as John DeJohn.
- Horace Palm and Timothy Lutes each testified that they never received or authorized endorsement on the check on which they were named as payee.
- The checks cashed by Andy Spyropoulos for John DeJohn bore forged endorsements of the respective payees, and John DeJohn's name did not appear on either check.
- A YMCA security guard 'arrested' John DeJohn when he found him behind a reception desk at the YMCA, in violation of the establishment’s rules.
- A Chicago police officer, during an unrelated search of John DeJohn at police headquarters, found other checks, including a Treasury check, made out to a Michael Dore, which John DeJohn stated he obtained from a mailbox behind the YMCA reception desk for safekeeping.
Procedural Posture:
- John DeJohn was charged in a federal district court with uttering and publishing two United States Treasury checks in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 495.
- A jury found John DeJohn guilty of the charges.
- The district court denied John DeJohn's motion for judgment of acquittal.
- The district court sentenced John DeJohn to a seven-year prison term on each count, to run concurrently, and imposed a thousand-dollar fine for each count.
- At the request of defense counsel, the district court stayed execution of the sentence for sixty days so that counsel and DeJohn’s brother could seek employment for him.
- John DeJohn appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the admission of certain evidence, limitation of cross-examination, denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, refusal of certain jury instructions, and the district court's sentence.
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Issue:
Does the admission of 'other bad acts' evidence to show opportunity, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge of forgery, the limitation of cross-examination, or the refusal to give a specific presumption of innocence jury instruction constitute reversible error in a conviction for uttering forged Treasury checks?
Opinions:
Majority - Harlington Wood, Jr.
No, the district court did not commit reversible error regarding the admission of evidence, sufficiency of evidence, limitations on cross-examination, or jury instructions, and the sentence was not an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the 'other bad acts' evidence (DeJohn found behind the YMCA desk and possessing other checks from a mailbox) was highly probative of DeJohn's opportunity to gain access to the mailboxes and obtain the forged checks. This evidence was properly admissible under Rule 404(b) for establishing opportunity, especially after the defense suggested it was not DeJohn who uttered the checks, making opportunity a key issue. The government was not obligated to stipulate to these facts, as the probative value of the testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect. The court also determined there was sufficient circumstantial evidence—including DeJohn's presentation of the checks, his statements implying genuineness, the payees' testimony of non-receipt, and DeJohn's established opportunity to access the mailboxes—to allow a jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that DeJohn knew the endorsements were forged and intended to defraud. Limitations on cross-examination were deemed non-prejudicial, as the defense still had ample opportunity to develop its theory. Furthermore, the district court's refusal to give defendant's specific jury instructions on the elements of the offense or the presumption of innocence was not reversible error because the instructions given sufficiently covered the essential legal principles, including the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with Kentucky v. Whorton. Finally, the sentence imposed was within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion, given DeJohn's extensive criminal record, and the conditional stay of sentence for employment did not deny due process.
Concurring - Cudahy
Yes, I concur with the judgment affirming the conviction, but with reservations regarding the liberal admission of 'other bad acts' testimony. While the evidence was relevant to establish DeJohn's opportunity to gain access to the mailboxes and obtain the checks, the testimony detailing his 'arrest' by a security guard and a subsequent, unrelated search by a police officer introduced extraneous and prejudicial spectacles. For the simple objective fact of opportunity, a straightforward stipulation would have been equally probative and considerably less prejudicial. However, the desirability of such a stipulation was not sufficiently pressed to resolution by the defendant, and thus, I concur with the majority's decision.
Analysis:
This case provides important clarification on the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), particularly for proving 'opportunity,' suggesting that evidence of 'other bad acts' can be highly probative and admissible even if the defendant does not explicitly dispute the issue, as long as it becomes a key issue in the defense's theory. It also reinforces judicial discretion in crafting jury instructions, holding that a court's thorough explanation of the burden of proof and reasonable doubt can adequately convey the presumption of innocence, even if a specific instruction is not given. However, the concurring opinion highlights the persistent tension between the probative value and prejudicial effect of 'other bad acts' evidence, especially when less inflammatory alternatives like stipulations might be available, offering a point for future legal arguments regarding evidentiary admissions.
