United States v. Jerry Dejesus
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 21080, 2003 WL 22365361, 347 F.3d 500 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
The Equal Protection Clause is not violated when the government uses a peremptory strike against a potential juror based on their high degree of religious involvement or strong beliefs, as this is considered a neutral reason distinct from impermissible strikes based on race or a specific religious affiliation.
Facts:
- Jerry DeJesus, who had a prior felony conviction, was arrested following a report of a stolen car and a high-speed pursuit.
- At the time of his arrest, police found a firearm and two magazine clips in his jacket pocket.
- During jury selection for his trial, prospective juror Ronald McBride, an African American man, disclosed his deep involvement in his church, including being a deacon, Sunday school teacher, holding biblical degrees, and having learned to forgive his cousin's murderer.
- Prospective juror James Bates, also an African American man, revealed he was an officer and trustee in his church, primarily read the Bible, and that his hobbies were church activities.
- The government prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove both McBride and Bates from the jury pool.
- The government also used a peremptory strike to remove George B. Pressey, a Caucasian man, who was also highly active in his church, serving on the board of trustees and heading the ushering department.
Procedural Posture:
- Jerry DeJesus was charged in U.S. District Court with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- His first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
- During jury selection for the retrial, defense counsel made a Batson challenge after the government peremptorily struck two African American prospective jurors, Bates and McBride.
- The government offered race-neutral reasons for the strikes related to the jurors' religious beliefs and activities, which the District Court accepted, thereby denying the Batson challenge.
- The jury found DeJesus guilty.
- The District Court denied DeJesus's post-trial motion for a mistrial, which was based on the same Batson objections.
- At sentencing, the District Court applied a four-level upward adjustment under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding DeJesus possessed the firearm 'in connection with' another felony offense (car theft).
- DeJesus (appellant) appealed his conviction and sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the government violate the Equal Protection Clause by using peremptory strikes against potential jurors based on their high degree of religious involvement, which the government fears might make them reluctant to convict, rather than their race or specific religious denomination?
Opinions:
Majority - Fuentes, J.
No. The government does not violate the Equal Protection Clause when its peremptory strikes are based on a juror's heightened religious involvement rather than their race or specific religious affiliation. The court held that the government's religion-related reasons were race-neutral and not pretextual. The credibility of the prosecutor's explanation is a factual determination for the trial judge, who was not clearly erroneous in accepting it. Evidence supporting the lack of racial pretext included the government striking a Caucasian juror (Pressey) for similar reasons of religious activity, and the fact that the final jury included three African American members while the government had peremptory strikes remaining. Crucially, the court distinguished between striking a juror based on their specific religious affiliation (e.g., being a Catholic or Muslim), which may be unconstitutional, and striking them based on their demonstrated religious beliefs or high level of religious activity that could reasonably lead a prosecutor to believe they would be reluctant to convict. The latter is a permissible, belief-based strike, not an impermissible, status-based one.
Dissenting - Stapleton, J.
Yes. The government violates the Equal Protection Clause because striking a juror based on their 'heightened religious involvement' is an impermissible form of religious discrimination. The dissent argues that religion, like race and gender, is a suspect classification subject to heightened scrutiny. The government's action constituted stereotyping, assuming that a class of people (the highly religious) are likely to be reluctant to sit in judgment, which is the exact practice forbidden by Batson and J.E.B. The majority's distinction between 'religious affiliation' and 'heightened religious involvement' is unpersuasive, as both are classifications based on religion. Since the jurors themselves affirmed they could follow the law, the government's strike was based on an impermissible stereotype. The case should have been remanded for a dual-motivation analysis, as the prosecutor offered other potentially neutral reasons for the strikes.
Analysis:
This decision establishes an important, though fine, distinction in Batson jurisprudence within the Third Circuit. It permits attorneys to strike potential jurors based on their perceived level of religiosity or devoutness, so long as the reason is articulated as a concern about the juror's beliefs affecting their ability to judge, rather than their membership in a specific religious group. This provides a pathway for striking jurors who seem overly devout, which could impact jury composition in cases with moral or ethical dimensions. However, as the dissent highlights, this creates a potentially subjective standard that could be used as a proxy for discriminating against jurors of certain faiths that are often associated with high levels of visible religious practice.
