United States v. Jerri C. Lewis
1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16210, 833 F.2d 1380, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 432 (1987)
Rule of Law:
A trial judge cannot rely on personal experience or facts outside the evidentiary record to determine the voluntariness of a defendant's confession. A subsequent confession made after proper Miranda warnings is admissible if it was voluntary, even if a prior unwarned statement was made, provided the prior statement was not the product of actual coercion.
Facts:
- On October 9, 1986, a bank was robbed.
- On October 10, 1986, Special Agent Michael E. Degnan identified Jerri C. Lewis as the person depicted in photographs taken during the bank robbery.
- On October 20, 1986, Jerri C. Lewis was arrested.
- On October 21, 1986, Special Agents Degnan and Fujita went to the San Francisco General Hospital to interview Lewis and learned she had just undergone surgery for an abscess caused by narcotic injection.
- During a two-minute conversation on October 21, 1986, after telling Lewis they would return the next day, Agent Degnan asked Lewis if she was going to 'come clean,' and she responded 'three' when asked about the number of robberies.
- On October 22, 1986, the agents returned, and the hall nurse informed them that Lewis was alert and not under medication that would affect her ability to be interviewed.
- On October 22, 1986, Lewis was advised of her Miranda rights, read and signed a waiver form acknowledging no promises, threats, or coercion, and then admitted to committing three robberies.
Procedural Posture:
- Jerri C. Lewis was charged with bank robbery in district court.
- Lewis filed a motion in district court to suppress statements she made to FBI agents on October 21, 1986, and October 22, 1986, arguing the first was involuntary and the second was tainted by the first.
- The district court granted Lewis's motion to suppress both statements, finding the October 21 statement involuntary due to Lewis's medical state and the judge's personal experience with anesthesia, and the October 22 statement to be a tainted continuation.
- The government appealed the district court's order suppressing the confession to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial judge's reliance on personal experience rather than record evidence improperly determine a defendant's initial unwarned statement was involuntary, and if so, does such an initial statement automatically taint a subsequent Miranda-warned confession?
Opinions:
Majority - ALARCON, Circuit Judge
No, a trial judge's reliance on personal experience about the effects of anesthesia, rather than record evidence, does not support a finding that a defendant's initial unwarned statement was involuntary. Furthermore, a non-coerced, albeit unwarned, initial statement does not automatically taint a subsequent voluntary and Miranda-warned confession. The district court erred by relying on its personal experience with anesthesia in concluding Lewis's October 21 statement was involuntary. This reliance violated Federal Rules of Evidence 605 (judge as witness) and 602 (personal knowledge), and Rule 201 (judicial notice), which prohibits a judge from using personal knowledge known only as an individual observer. The record, based solely on Agent Degnan’s declaration as accepted by the district court, showed Lewis was alert, responsive, and able to recall past events accurately during the brief October 21 interaction, indicating her statement was voluntary despite the lack of Miranda warnings. There was no evidence in the record to support the judge's inference that she was incapacitated by heroin withdrawal or anesthesia. The agents' conduct on October 21 was not coercive. Citing Oregon v. Elstad, the court clarified that a subsequent confession, made after proper Miranda warnings, is admissible even if a prior unwarned statement was obtained, provided the prior statement was not actually coerced under the Fifth Amendment. The 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine and its attenuation analysis, as outlined in Brown v. Illinois, only applies when the initial statement was the result of actual coercion, not merely a procedural Miranda violation. The district court incorrectly applied an attenuation analysis. The October 22 confession was voluntary because 24 hours had elapsed, Lewis received and waived her Miranda rights, she appeared alert and improved, and she had prior experience with law enforcement and Miranda waivers. The agents did not exploit the prior unwarned admission.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the critical distinction between an unwarned statement (a procedural Miranda violation) and an actually coerced statement (a Fifth Amendment violation), significantly impacting the admissibility of subsequent confessions. It reinforces that the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine applies only to truly coerced statements, not to mere Miranda violations. Furthermore, the decision strongly reaffirms the evidentiary principle that trial judges must base their factual findings solely on the evidence presented in the record, prohibiting reliance on personal experience or un-noticed adjudicative facts, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process and ensuring due process for both parties.
