United States v. Jerome T. Bland
472 F.2d 1329 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
Congress may define who is considered a "child" for the purposes of juvenile jurisdiction, and a statute that automatically excludes 16 and 17-year-olds charged by a prosecutor with specific serious felonies from juvenile court without a prior hearing does not violate due process or equal protection, nor does it negate the presumption of innocence, as such a charging decision is a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Facts:
- The appellee, Bland, was born on July 30, 1954.
- On February 8, 1971, Bland was 16 years old.
- Bland was charged with armed robbery of a post office and related offenses.
- The United States Attorney charged Bland with these offenses as an adult pursuant to 16 D.C.Code § 2301(3)(A).
Procedural Posture:
- Bland moved in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to dismiss his indictment for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the statutory basis for prosecuting him as an adult was constitutionally deficient due to a lack of procedural due process.
- The District Court dismissed the indictment, holding 16 D.C.Code § 2301(3)(A) unconstitutional as both an arbitrary legislative classification and a negation of the presumption of innocence.
- The United States, as the statutory appellant, sought review of the District Court's memorandum opinion and order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
Does 16 D.C.Code § 2301(3)(A), which automatically subjects 16 and 17-year-olds charged by the United States Attorney with certain serious felonies to adult prosecution without a prior hearing, violate due process, equal protection, or the presumption of innocence?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilkey
No, 16 D.C.Code § 2301(3)(A) does not violate due process, equal protection, or the presumption of innocence because Congress has the authority to define who constitutes a "child" for juvenile jurisdiction, and the prosecutor's decision to charge a 16 or 17-year-old with enumerated felonies is a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion that does not require a prior hearing. The court first notes that legislative classifications are entitled to a strong presumption of validity and can only be set aside if no grounds can be conceived to justify them. Congress, in exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, rationally defined "child" in Section 2301 to address problems in the juvenile justice system, specifically the rise in serious crimes committed by 16+ year-olds and their growing recidivism, concluding some were beyond rehabilitation and negatively influenced others. This exclusion is not unusual, with many states and federal law similarly excluding certain crimes or ages from juvenile jurisdiction. The court emphasizes Congress's power to define statutory terms, noting that the new definition of "child" means that individuals meeting the statutory criteria (16 or older and charged with specified felonies) are never classified as children for Family Division jurisdiction. Therefore, there is no "waiver" of jurisdiction from a juvenile court, as the Family Division never acquires jurisdiction in the first place for these individuals. The exercise of discretion by the United States Attorney to charge enumerated offenses, thereby initiating adult prosecution, is a long-accepted concept of prosecutorial discretion derived from the separation of powers. Courts generally do not interfere with this discretion unless it is based on arbitrary classifications like race or religion. The significant effect of the decision does not automatically require an adversary hearing, as many prosecutorial decisions have grave consequences (e.g., charging misdemeanor vs. felony) without requiring such a hearing. The court rejects the idea that Kent v. United States is applicable, distinguishing it as concerning a transfer from an existing juvenile jurisdiction. Finally, the court holds that the prosecutor's decision does not violate the presumption of innocence. This decision is merely a determination that there is sufficient evidence for adult prosecution, not a judgment of guilt or an imposition of penalty. It does not relieve the government of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor does it remove the right to a jury trial. The traditional protections of procedural due process are available during the subsequent trial, along with rehabilitation provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
Dissenting - J. Skelly Wright
Yes, the statute is unconstitutional because the Supreme Court's ruling in Kent v. United States mandates that before a child under 18 can be tried in adult court, the Constitution requires a hearing that satisfies basic due process and fairness, and Congress cannot sidestep this constitutional requirement through a statutory redefinition of "child." The dissent argues that the majority fundamentally misunderstands the issues by ignoring Kent v. United States, which held that the waiver decision is "critically important" and requires a hearing with counsel and a statement of reasons. The new 16 D.C.Code § 2301(3)(A) merely creates a "second, parallel waiver procedure" allowing the prosecutor to effectively transfer a juvenile to adult court without these constitutionally mandated protections. The legislative history explicitly reveals Congress's intent to overcome the "substantial difficulties in transferring juvenile offenders" under prior law, which referred to the Kent requirements. The dissent contends that the test for when due process requires a hearing depends on the importance of the decision to the individual, not on whether a judge or a prosecutor makes it. Transferring this crucial decision to a partisan prosecutor, who is less disinterested than a judge, increases the need for due process, not diminishes it. The "grievous loss" consequences of adult prosecution remain the same, regardless of the decision-maker. The argument that no "pre-existing right" to juvenile treatment exists is fallacious. The Family Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over a "child" until the U.S. Attorney charges an enumerated offense, at which point the defendant's status as a "child" is terminated, thereby divesting the Family Court of jurisdiction. This is functionally identical to the waiver process examined in Kent. While the Sixth Amendment right to counsel might be debated at a pre-charge prosecutorial stage, the right to counsel flows from the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee, as counsel is necessary to ensure the hearing is meaningful, especially for a "frightened juvenile." The dissent asserts that broad prosecutorial discretion does not grant a "license for arbitrary procedure." The prosecutor's discretion to choose between juvenile and criminal procedures must still comport with due process. Unlike other charging decisions, the waiver decision regarding juvenile treatment is largely unreviewable and final; therefore, fair procedures are essential at this critical stage where factors like maturity and rehabilitation are considered. The argument that adult court provides "traditional protections" misses the point: these protections ensure a fair trial, not a fair choice of forum.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the bounds of legislative power to define juvenile court jurisdiction and the scope of prosecutorial discretion, particularly in the context of due process rights established in Kent v. United States. By upholding a statute that automatically assigns certain 16 and 17-year-olds to adult court based solely on the nature of the charge and the prosecutor's decision, Bland effectively distinguishes the "transfer" scenario of Kent from an "initial classification" or "jurisdictional definition." This decision reinforces the principle that prosecutorial charging decisions are generally immune from judicial review absent evidence of arbitrary discrimination and limits the procedural protections available at the point of initial jurisdictional determination, shifting the focus to traditional protections at trial.
