United States v. Javier Garcia
974 F.3d 1071 (2020)
Rule of Law:
The attenuation doctrine does not permit the admission of evidence discovered following an unlawful warrantless entry into a home, even if a subsequent search is authorized by a pre-existing suspicionless search condition, where there is close temporal proximity between the violation and discovery, the decision to conduct the search is discretionary and potentially influenced by the initial illegality, and the initial violation was a flagrant intrusion into the home.
Facts:
- Officers Richard Lopez and Raul Rosales observed Alfonso Nevarez run from them, holding his waistband, and enter an apartment where Javier Garcia resided.
- Within five minutes, Officer Rosales apprehended Nevarez in a nearby backyard after Nevarez exited through a window.
- Even though Nevarez was safely in custody, Officer Lopez and two sergeants entered Garcia's apartment without a warrant, with guns drawn, to check for injured persons and conduct a protective sweep.
- The officers encountered Javier Garcia, who was coming out of the bathroom and stated he had been asleep, displaying creases on his face consistent with that account.
- The officers handcuffed Garcia, took him outside, and used his name to run a records check.
- The records check revealed Garcia was subject to a federal supervised release condition authorizing suspicionless searches of his person, residence, or property by any law enforcement officer at any time.
- Purporting to rely on this condition, Officer Lopez reentered the apartment to conduct a full search.
- During the second search, Officer Lopez found a wallet and bags of methamphetamine under a sleeping pad on the floor, and more methamphetamine and Garcia's identification inside the wallet.
- After his arrest and transport to the police station, Garcia admitted that the methamphetamine in the wallet was his.
Procedural Posture:
- Javier Garcia was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
- Garcia filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the apartment and his incriminating statements in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
- The district court denied Garcia's motion to suppress, finding the initial entry permissible under the 'emergency aid' and 'protective sweep' exceptions.
- Garcia appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Garcia I), which reversed the district court's ruling, holding that the initial warrantless entry into Garcia's home violated the Fourth Amendment.
- The Ninth Circuit (Garcia I) remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of the evidence discovered during, and as a result of, the second search.
- On remand, the district court again denied the motion to suppress, concluding that under the attenuation doctrine, the officers' discovery of the suspicionless search condition was an intervening circumstance analogous to Utah v. Strieff.
- Garcia appealed the district court's second denial of the motion to suppress to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the attenuation doctrine sufficiently break the causal chain between an initial unlawful warrantless entry into a home and the discovery of incriminating evidence when officers, shortly after the illegal entry, discover a defendant's suspicionless search condition and then conduct a second, discretionary search based on that condition?
Opinions:
Majority - Wardlaw, Circuit Judge
No, the attenuation doctrine does not sufficiently break the causal chain between an initial unlawful warrantless entry into a home and the discovery of incriminating evidence where officers, shortly after the illegal entry, discover a defendant's suspicionless search condition and then conduct a second, discretionary search based on that condition. The Court concluded that the evidence found was not sufficiently attenuated from the constitutional violation and therefore reversed Garcia's conviction. The Ninth Circuit applied the three-factor attenuation doctrine test from Brown v. Illinois, as reaffirmed in Utah v. Strieff: (1) temporal proximity, (2) intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. First, the court agreed with the government that the 'temporal proximity' factor weighed in favor of suppression, as only a few minutes passed between the unconstitutional entry and the reentry for the investigatory search. Second, regarding 'intervening circumstances,' the court distinguished Garcia's suspicionless search condition from the arrest warrant in Strieff. Unlike a warrant, which is a 'judicial mandate' compelling a 'ministerial act' of arrest, Garcia's search condition merely granted discretionary authority to search. The officers' decision to avail themselves of this authority was 'volitional,' not compelled. Citing United States v. Gorman and Frimmel Management., LLC v. United States, the court emphasized that when an officer's exercise of discretionary authority is 'significantly directed' by information learned during an unlawful search, the mere existence of that authority is not an intervening cause that purges the taint. The government failed to present evidence that the officers' decision to conduct the second search was untainted by what they saw inside the home minutes earlier during their unconstitutional entry, despite an abrupt shift in their motives from non-investigatory to investigatory in that short interval. The court rejected the government's argument that attenuation would apply even if the decision was influenced by the earlier entry, as this position contradicts established precedent. Third, concerning the 'purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,' the court found the violation particularly significant because officers entered Garcia's home without cause, detained him at gunpoint, and removed him from the premises in handcuffs. The sanctity of the home, being 'first among equals' for Fourth Amendment protection, warrants a higher need for deterrence than a street stop. While acknowledging the district court's finding that the officers believed their initial entry was for public safety, the court concluded that whatever role subjective good faith plays, it was not enough to outweigh the other two factors, which strongly favored suppression. The court referenced United States v. Bocharnikov, where a good faith belief did not prevent suppression when balancing all three factors, especially given the much closer temporal proximity here.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the attenuation doctrine post-Utah v. Strieff, particularly concerning Fourth Amendment violations involving the home and discretionary law enforcement authority. It establishes that a pre-existing search condition, unlike an arrest warrant, is not automatically an intervening circumstance sufficient to dissipate the taint of an unlawful entry if the decision to use that authority is discretionary and potentially influenced by the initial illegality. The ruling reinforces the high protection afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment and places a substantial burden on the government to prove that subsequent evidence discovery was genuinely untainted by prior unlawful conduct, especially when temporal proximity is close. This decision will likely make it harder for the government to admit evidence discovered after an illegal home entry, even if a valid search condition is later found.
