United States v. Janis
428 U.S. 433 (1976)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The judicially created exclusionary rule does not apply to federal civil proceedings, such as a tax assessment case, when the unconstitutional search was conducted by a state criminal law enforcement officer.
Facts:
- In November 1968, Los Angeles police obtained a warrant to search for bookmaking paraphernalia at apartments belonging to Max Janis and Morris Levine.
- Pursuant to the warrant, police searched Janis's property, arrested him, and seized $4,940 in cash and various wagering records.
- A Los Angeles police officer, Leonard Weissman, contacted an agent of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and informed him of Janis's arrest for bookmaking.
- With Weissman's assistance, the IRS agent analyzed the seized records to determine the volume of Janis's gambling activity.
- Weissman also informed the IRS agent that police had conducted surveillance on Janis for a 77-day period.
- Based exclusively on the evidence seized by the Los Angeles police and the information provided by Officer Weissman, the IRS assessed $89,026.09 in wagering taxes against Janis.
- The IRS then levied upon the $4,940 in cash seized by the police as partial satisfaction of the tax assessment.
Procedural Posture:
- In a separate state criminal proceeding, the Los Angeles Municipal Court granted Janis's motion to quash the search warrant, finding the supporting affidavit insufficient.
- Janis filed a claim with the IRS for a refund of the seized $4,940, which was not honored.
- Janis sued the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for a refund.
- The U.S. government filed a counterclaim against Janis for the unpaid balance of the tax assessment.
- The District Court held that the tax assessment was based on illegally obtained evidence, suppressed the evidence, and entered judgment for Janis, quashing the assessment.
- The United States, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of Janis, the appellee.
- The United States petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is evidence seized unconstitutionally by a state law enforcement officer, in good-faith reliance on a warrant, inadmissible in a federal civil proceeding brought by the United States?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
No. Evidence seized unconstitutionally by a state law enforcement officer is admissible in a federal civil tax proceeding. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, and its application is determined by weighing its deterrent benefits against its societal costs. Here, any additional deterrent effect from excluding the evidence in a federal civil case is marginal and highly attenuated. The state officer is already deterred by the exclusion of the evidence from both state and federal criminal proceedings, which are the officer's primary zone of interest. The societal cost of excluding relevant and reliable evidence from a civil tax proceeding outweighs the minimal additional deterrence that might be achieved, making an extension of the exclusionary rule to this context unjustifiable.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The exclusionary rule is a necessary constitutional component of the Fourth Amendment, not merely a judicially created remedy whose application depends on a cost-benefit analysis. The Court's decision continues a trend of weakening the rule. Even under the majority's deterrence rationale, the evidence should be excluded for the reasons outlined in Justice Stewart's dissent.
Dissenting - Justice Stewart
Yes. The evidence must be excluded under the precedent of Elkins v. United States, which abolished the 'silver platter doctrine.' Federal wagering tax enforcement is quasi-criminal and closely intertwined with state and federal criminal law enforcement. Allowing the IRS to use evidence that is inadmissible in a criminal trial creates an incentive for state officers to conduct unconstitutional searches, knowing they can turn the evidence over to federal civil authorities on a 'silver platter.' This completely frustrates the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, forcing society to pay the cost of the rule (losing criminal convictions) without receiving its benefit (deterrence).
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtailed the reach of the exclusionary rule by refusing to extend it to intersovereign civil proceedings. The Court solidified the rule's rationale as being primarily for deterrence, subject to a cost-benefit analysis, rather than as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party. This created a clear distinction between the rule's application in criminal trials versus civil contexts involving a different sovereign, establishing that the attenuation of the deterrent effect in the latter scenario does not justify the societal cost of excluding relevant evidence. The ruling effectively permits one sovereign (the federal government) to use the fruits of an unconstitutional search conducted by another sovereign (a state) in a civil case.
