United States v. Janet Woodley
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 27756, 53 U.S.L.W. 2360, 751 F.2d 1008 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The President's power under the Recess Appointment Clause of Article II to fill vacancies during a recess of the Senate extends to the appointment of Article III federal judges, creating a constitutional exception to the general requirement that such judges hold their offices "during good Behaviour."
Facts:
- President Jimmy Carter nominated Walter Heen to a judicial vacancy in the United States District Court for Hawaii.
- The Senate held confirmation hearings but recessed without holding a full vote on Heen's nomination.
- During the Senate recess on December 31, 1980, President Carter conferred a temporary commission on Judge Heen pursuant to the Recess Appointment Clause.
- Heen took the oath of office and began serving as a U.S. District Judge.
- President Ronald Reagan subsequently withdrew Heen's formal nomination from the Senate.
- While serving under his recess commission, Judge Heen presided over the criminal proceedings of Janet Woodley, who was indicted on narcotics violations.
- Judge Heen denied Woodley's motion to suppress evidence and, after a bench trial, found her guilty of the charges.
Procedural Posture:
- Janet Woodley was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii.
- The district court, with recess-appointee Judge Heen presiding, denied Woodley's motion to suppress evidence and subsequently found her guilty.
- Woodley appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, acting on its own initiative (sua sponte), raised the issue of whether Judge Heen could constitutionally preside over the case.
- The panel concluded that the appointment was unconstitutional and vacated Woodley's conviction.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc to consider the issue.
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Issue:
Does the President's appointment of a federal judge during a recess of the Senate, pursuant to the Recess Appointment Clause of Article II, violate the provisions of Article III that require federal judges to hold their offices during good behavior and receive undiminished compensation?
Opinions:
Majority - Beezer, J.
No. The President's appointment of a federal judge during a Senate recess does not violate Article III because the Recess Appointment Clause grants the President the power to fill all vacancies, including judicial ones, on a temporary basis. The Constitution must be read as a single, coherent instrument, and Article II's specific provision for recess appointments is of equal validity to Article III's provisions for judicial tenure. The court's reasoning is grounded in the plain text of Article II, which applies to "all Vacancies" and references "Judges of the supreme Court" in the preceding clause. This interpretation is overwhelmingly supported by nearly 200 years of unbroken historical practice, accepted by all three branches of government, beginning with President Washington and including approximately 300 judicial recess appointments throughout history. This long-standing consensus distinguishes the practice from the recent legislative veto struck down in INS v. Chadha and aligns it with the historical acceptance analysis in Marsh v. Chambers. Finally, the clause prevents governmental paralysis and ensures the continued administration of justice, making it a necessary and extraordinary exception to the general prescriptions of Article III.
Dissenting - Norris, J.
Yes. The President's appointment of a judge without life tenure and salary protection violates the explicit and unqualified command of Article III that the judicial power be exercised only by independent judges. The majority erred by uncritically deferring to historical practice instead of weighing the competing constitutional values at stake. The fundamental principle of judicial independence, which is the 'citadel of the public justice,' is paramount and far outweighs the administrative convenience served by the Recess Appointment Clause. A recess appointee is inherently vulnerable to political pressure from the President and Senate while awaiting confirmation, which undermines both the reality and appearance of judicial independence, as evidenced by historical examples like Justice Brennan's confirmation hearings. Unlike the practice in Marsh v. Chambers, there is no evidence the Framers carefully considered or debated the application of the recess power to the judiciary; it was a unilateral executive practice. Because Article III's protections also serve as a personal right for litigants to have their case decided by an independent arbiter, historical practice cannot extinguish this fundamental right.
Analysis:
This en banc decision solidifies the constitutionality of judicial recess appointments, establishing that the President's Article II power creates a direct, albeit temporary, exception to Article III's life tenure requirement. The ruling prioritizes textualism and long-standing historical practice over a structuralist argument for absolute judicial independence. By affirming this executive power, the court ensures continuity in government but also perpetuates a tension, highlighted by the dissent, between administrative efficiency and the core constitutional value of an independent judiciary insulated from political pressure.
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