United States v. James O. Bakker
32 Fed. R. Serv. 303, 925 F.2d 728, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1925 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A sentence violates the Due Process Clause when the sentencing judge's remarks create a strong apprehension that the sentence was based on impermissible considerations, such as the judge's personal religious beliefs and sense of betrayal.
Facts:
- In 1974, James Bakker formed the PTL corporation and later began developing 'Heritage USA,' a Christian retreat center.
- From 1984 to 1987, Bakker sold 'lifetime partnerships' through mail and television broadcasts to finance the construction of hotels and other facilities at Heritage USA.
- These partnerships, costing up to $10,000, promised annual lodging benefits to purchasers, many of whom drew on meager incomes.
- Bakker raised at least $158 million by selling approximately 153,000 partnerships with lodging benefits.
- He promised to limit the number of partnerships sold for each facility but grossly oversold them; for instance, he sold 66,683 partnerships for a hotel planned to have only 25,000.
- Bakker diverted a significant portion of the funds from partnership sales to pay for PTL's operating expenses and to support his own lavish lifestyle, which included gold-plated fixtures and private jets.
- Consequently, most promised facilities were never completed, and the overwhelming majority of partners never received their promised lodging benefits.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted James Bakker on eight counts of mail fraud, fifteen counts of wire fraud, and one count of conspiracy.
- Following a five-week trial in the U.S. District Court (trial court), a jury found Bakker guilty on all 24 counts.
- The trial judge sentenced Bakker to 45 years in prison and imposed a $500,000 fine.
- Bakker (appellant) appealed both his conviction and his sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (intermediate appellate court).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial judge violate a defendant's due process rights at sentencing by making remarks that suggest the judge's own religious beliefs were a factor in the sentencing decision?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilkinson, Circuit Judge
Yes, a trial judge violates a defendant's due process rights at sentencing by making such remarks. The court affirmed Bakker's conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial proceedings regarding jury selection, denial of a continuance, evidentiary rulings, or jury instructions. However, the court vacated the sentence because the judge's remarks during sentencing injected an impermissible consideration into the process. The judge stated that Bakker's actions ridiculed 'those of us who do have a religion.' This comment created a strong apprehension that the lengthy prison term reflected the court's own sense of religious propriety being betrayed, rather than being based solely on permissible sentencing factors. While a judge can act as the 'embodiment of public condemnation and social outrage,' the court cannot use the bench as a 'pulpit from which judges announce their personal sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish defendants for offending it.' This crosses the boundary of due process, requiring the sentence to be vacated and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a critical limit on judicial discretion in sentencing, particularly in the pre-Sentencing Guidelines era. It establishes that while judges have broad latitude, their personal characteristics and beliefs, especially religious convictions, cannot form the basis of a sentence. The ruling creates a strong precedent that an explicit, on-the-record reference to a judge's personal religious offense can be grounds for vacating a sentence on due process grounds. This holding protects defendants from being punished not just for their crime, but for offending a judge's personal, non-legal sensibilities, thereby reinforcing the principle of judicial impartiality.
