United States v. James Dinkins
2012 WL 3292417, 691 F.3d 358 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A district court may empanel an anonymous jury in rare circumstances when there is strong reason to protect the jury from interference or harm, or to ensure the integrity of its function, provided reasonable safeguards are adopted to minimize infringement on the accused's rights. Furthermore, a defendant can forfeit their Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness whose unavailability was wrongfully procured by a co-conspirator, if the act was foreseeable, in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy, and designed to prevent testimony.
Facts:
- In 2003, the Baltimore City Police Department began investigating "Special," a drug-trafficking organization in the Bartlett neighborhood, led by Melvin Gilbert, with James Dinkins as an "enforcer" and Darron Goods as a drug seller.
- On October 16, 2003, Gilbert and Randy McLean were arrested in the Bartlett neighborhood, and officers seized large quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, several firearms, and thousands of dollars from houses associated with Special.
- Shortly after his release from incarceration in July 2005, Gilbert was introduced to Frank Batts, the leader of another large drug organization, and over the next year, Batts purchased "wholesale" quantities of heroin from Gilbert and other Special members.
- On September 10, 2005, Gilbert identified Shannon Jemmison, a suspected government informant, to Batts, and Gilbert and Batts hired Dinkins to kill Jemmison; Dinkins then shot and killed Jemmison.
- Beginning in October 2004, John Dowery, a drug dealer and member of Special, witnessed a murder and subsequently began providing law enforcement officers with information about that murder and Special's operations, becoming widely known as a "snitch."
- On October 19, 2005, Dinkins and co-conspirator Damien West attempted to murder Dowery, shooting him multiple times; Dowery survived and later identified Dinkins from a photo array as one of the shooters.
- On November 10, 2005, Dinkins shot and killed Michael Bryant, a fellow Special member, because Bryant was upset about Dinkins's attempt to kill Dowery; Dinkins was arrested on December 9, 2005, and remained incarcerated thereafter.
- In January 2006, Dowery testified in a state trial against other Special members, and despite witness protection measures, Gilbert sent a threatening message to Dowery through Dowery's son, Cecil, indicating knowledge of Dowery's relocated whereabouts.
- On Thanksgiving Day, November 23, 2006, Dowery returned to the Bartlett area against police advice, and Gilbert and Goods shot Dowery several times, causing his death.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury charged James Dinkins, Melvin Gilbert, and Darron Goods (along with others) in a twelve-count indictment related to narcotics trafficking, witness murders, and firearms offenses.
- The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the government's motion for a joint trial for the defendants.
- The district court denied Darron Goods' motion to sever the charges against him.
- The district court decided to empanel an anonymous jury, withholding certain biographical information about prospective jurors, after hearing arguments from the government (supporting) and defendants (objecting).
- During voir dire, defendants made a Batson challenge, alleging the government's peremptory strike of an African-American female juror was racially discriminatory; the district court overruled the objection.
- During the trial, the district court ruled that certain hearsay statements made by the murdered government witness, John Dowery, were admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception.
- After a twelve-day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Dinkins, Gilbert, and Goods on all but one count.
- Each defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
- Dinkins, Gilbert, and Goods timely filed notices of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by empaneling an anonymous jury to protect jurors from interference or harm, particularly given that some defendants faced capital charges? 2. Did the district court err in admitting a murdered witness's hearsay statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause, even against a defendant who was incarcerated at the time of the murder, based on a theory of conspiratorial liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Barbara Milano Keenan
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling an anonymous jury. The court held that empaneling an anonymous jury requires (1) a strong reason to conclude that the jury needs protection from interference or harm or that the jury's function will be compromised, and (2) that reasonable safeguards have been adopted. For capital defendants (Dinkins and Gilbert), the decision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosing juror information may jeopardize life or safety (18 U.S.C. § 3432). For the non-capital defendant (Goods), the broader "interests of justice" standard applies (28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7)), which is satisfied if the capital standard is met. The court found strong reasons for anonymity based on the "Ross factors": defendants' involvement in the "Special" drug organization (organized crime), the organization's capacity to harm jurors (with unincarcerated members), past attempts to interfere with the judicial process (witness murders/attempts on Jemmison and Dowery), and the potential for lengthy incarceration. The record overwhelmingly supported these findings. The district court also implemented reasonable safeguards: counsel collaboratively drafted an extensive juror questionnaire, received zip codes/counties/neighborhoods (though not full addresses/names), and individual voir dire was conducted over four days. Jurors were not told that anonymity was for protection from the defendants, and instructions on the presumption of innocence were given. Therefore, the defendants' rights were not infringed. No, the district court did not err in admitting Dowery's hearsay statements. The court affirmed that the common law forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), and the Confrontation Clause, as clarified by Giles v. California, apply when a defendant's conduct was designed to prevent a witness from testifying. The court adopted the application of Pinkerton principles of conspiratorial liability to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing analysis. Under this framework, a defendant waives their Confrontation Clause rights if (1) they directly participated in planning or procuring the declarant's unavailability through wrongdoing, or (2) the wrongful procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy, and was designed to prevent the witness from testifying. The evidence demonstrated that Dowery's murder was reasonably foreseeable to Dinkins and in furtherance of Special's ongoing conspiracy to eliminate informants, which Dinkins initiated with the 2005 shooting attempt. Gilbert directly participated in Dowery's murder. The defendants' acts, and those of their co-conspirators, were intended to prevent, and did prevent, Dowery from testifying. Thus, the statements were properly admitted against Dinkins and Gilbert.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the Fourth Circuit's stance on the use of anonymous juries, establishing a two-part test and explicitly incorporating the "Ross factors" while distinguishing between capital and non-capital cases under different statutory standards. It critically expands the application of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception by formally adopting Pinkerton conspiratorial liability principles, enabling the admission of a deceased witness's testimonial statements against co-conspirators, even if they were incarcerated at the time of the witness's death, provided the act was foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy. This precedent broadens the tools available to prosecutors in organized crime and witness tampering cases, making it more challenging for criminal enterprises to silence witnesses effectively.
