United States v. Jacqueline Panseta Brown
299 F.3d 1252, 59 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 410, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15456 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, an expert witness may base their opinion on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, provided it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field; such reliance constitutes a 'firmly rooted' exception to the hearsay rule and does not violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.
Facts:
- Jacqueline Panseta Brown, a black Jamaican national, was traveling to Bermuda via Miami.
- During a stop in Miami, U.S. Customs officers discovered cocaine base concealed within the metal frames of her luggage carts.
- Brown denied having any knowledge of the drugs.
- After being appointed a public defender, Brown retained her own attorney, David Rowe.
- Several weeks later, Rowe filed a motion to withdraw, stating that Brown no longer wished for him to represent her.
Procedural Posture:
- The government indicted Jacqueline Panseta Brown in federal district court for importation of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute.
- Brown's retained counsel, David Rowe, filed a motion to withdraw, which a U.S. magistrate judge denied.
- The magistrate judge's denial of the motion to withdraw was not appealed to or reviewed by the district court judge.
- At trial, the district court overruled the defense's Batson objection to the government's use of peremptory strikes against African-American jurors.
- A jury in the U.S. District Court convicted Brown on both counts.
- Brown, the appellant, appealed her convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does an expert witness's testimony based on hearsay violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights if the hearsay is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that field?
Opinions:
Majority - Kravitch, J.
No. An expert witness's testimony based on hearsay does not violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights where the information is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that field. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 explicitly allows experts to rely on data that would not itself be admissible if it is 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.' The court reasons that this constitutes a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' as described in Ohio v. Roberts, thereby satisfying the Confrontation Clause. The DEA agent testified that his opinion on the drug's value was based on his experience in conjunction with information from another DEA agent and Bermudan authorities, and that such sources are regularly relied upon in valuating narcotics. Therefore, the testimony was properly admitted. The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of counsel's motion to withdraw because the magistrate judge's ruling was never appealed to the district court.
Concurring - Hill, J.
This opinion concurs with the majority's result but expresses significant doubt ('dubitante') about the fairness of the outcome. The author is troubled that Brown was forced to proceed with an attorney she had sought to discharge and that this attorney failed to properly object to the crucial double-hearsay testimony regarding the drugs' value, which was the sole basis for proving Brown's knowledge. While acknowledging that precedent and procedural rules compel an affirmance, the author finds it 'less than satisfying' to imprison a defendant for sixty-three months under these circumstances.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the power of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, affirming that experts can effectively serve as conduits for information that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay. By classifying this as a 'firmly rooted' exception, the court makes it more difficult for criminal defendants to mount Confrontation Clause challenges against the basis of an expert's opinion. This precedent gives prosecutors considerable latitude in proving elements like drug value, which can be crucial for establishing a defendant's knowledge, without needing to produce every individual in the information chain for cross-examination.
