United States v. Jackson
248 F.3d 1028, 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7905 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
For federal kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5), which applies to the kidnapping of certain officers and employees, only general intent is required, meaning the prosecution must prove the defendant voluntarily and intentionally committed the proscribed act, not that they specifically intended to violate the law or had an unlawful objective beyond the act itself.
Facts:
- On December 24, 1997, David L. Jackson took seven postal employees hostage.
- The postal employees sustained injuries and endured ten hours of fear and intimidation during the hostage situation.
- Ultimately, negotiators convinced Jackson to release the hostages and surrender.
- Jackson raised an insanity defense at trial.
- Jackson attempted to present evidence of diminished capacity during his trial.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted David L. Jackson on seven counts of kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5) and one count of carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
- Prior to trial, a psychiatrist evaluated Jackson regarding his competency to stand trial, the basis for an insanity defense, and whether he suffered from diminished capacity at the time of the offense.
- The district court ruled that evidence of diminished capacity was inadmissible, concluding that kidnapping under § 1201(a)(5) was a general intent offense, and diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes.
- A jury found Jackson guilty of all eight offenses.
- The district court sentenced Jackson to concurrent terms of 327 months for each kidnapping count and a consecutive term of 120 months on the firearm count.
- Jackson appealed his convictions on the seven counts of kidnapping to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5), which prohibits kidnapping of officers and employees engaged in official duties, require proof of specific intent or general intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Briscoe, Circuit Judge
No, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5) does not require specific intent; it is a general intent crime. The court determined the mens rea (mental state) required by interpreting the statute, beginning with its plain language. It noted that criminal statutes are typically presumed to require only general intent unless explicitly stated otherwise. General intent requires a defendant to know the facts that make their conduct illegal and to act voluntarily and intentionally, whereas specific intent requires an additional unlawful objective or purpose. The language of § 1201(a)(5) itself does not specify a particular mens rea. The court found no language suggesting that a defendant must know their conduct was illegal. While Jackson argued that the phrase “and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise” implied specific intent, the court clarified that the kidnapper’s underlying purpose is not an element of the offense. The court distinguished this from specific intent, citing prior circuit precedent (United States v. Blair) defining specific intent as acting with the objective of completing some unlawful act, and general intent as acting voluntarily and intentionally, not by mistake or accident. Critically, the court observed that § 1201(a)(1) explicitly uses the word “willfully,” which implies specific intent for that subsection. The absence of “willfully” in § 1201(a)(5) indicates Congress’s intent not to make (a)(5) a specific intent crime, as doing so would render the word “willfully” in (a)(1) mere surplusage. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that § 1201(a)(5) requires only general intent.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the mens rea requirement for a specific subsection of the federal kidnapping statute, distinguishing it from other subsections that may require specific intent. By classifying 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5) as a general intent crime, the Tenth Circuit limits the availability of certain defenses, such as diminished capacity, which are typically applicable only to specific intent offenses. This ruling emphasizes the principle that courts will not read specific intent requirements into statutes unless explicitly indicated by legislative language, particularly when other subsections of the same statute demonstrate Congress's ability to include such language. This precedent guides prosecutors and defense attorneys in handling federal kidnapping charges involving specified victims and informs judicial instructions on intent.
