United States v. Jackson
1 Fed. R. Serv. 56, 405 F. Supp. 938, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15185 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, a trial court has discretion to exclude evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction and post-crime conduct if it determines the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the evidence's probative value, and may impose conditions on such exclusions to ensure fairness to both parties.
Facts:
- The defendant, Jackson, was accused of committing an armed bank robbery on August 23, 1971.
- In July 1971, prior to the robbery, Jackson had been indicted by the state for assault, a crime for which he was later convicted as a felony.
- Shortly after the bank robbery, Jackson traveled to Georgia.
- On November 7, 1971, a police officer in Georgia stopped Jackson for a traffic check.
- At the time of his arrest in Georgia, Jackson used a false name and was in possession of false identification.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, Jackson, was charged in the U.S. District Court with armed bank robbery.
- Prior to trial, the defendant filed motions in limine seeking advance rulings on two evidentiary issues.
- The first motion sought to exclude the use of the defendant's recent state felony conviction for assault for impeachment purposes should he choose to testify.
- The second motion sought to exclude evidence of his arrest in Georgia and his use of a false name, arguing its probative value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
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Issue:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), does the probative value of admitting a defendant's prior felony assault conviction for impeachment purposes outweigh the prejudicial effect to the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Weinstein, District Judge
No, the probative value of admitting the defendant's prior felony assault conviction for impeachment purposes does not outweigh its prejudicial effect. The court determined that a prior conviction for assault has little bearing on a person's likelihood of telling the truth, yet it carries a significant risk of unfair prejudice. The jury might improperly conclude that because the defendant was violent in the past, he is likely guilty of the current armed robbery charge, which would be an impermissible propensity inference. The court noted that the government's case was not wholly dependent on the defendant's credibility, as it had other evidence such as surveillance photographs and co-conspirator testimony. However, the exclusion was granted on two conditions: 1) the defendant cannot mislead the jury by suggesting he has a pristine background, and 2) the defense cannot impeach government witnesses with their own assault convictions without prior court approval. The court also excluded evidence of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's Georgia arrest under FRE 403, conditioned on the defendant stipulating that he was in Georgia after the robbery and used a false name, thereby giving the prosecution the probative value of flight evidence without the prejudicial details of another arrest.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational example of a trial court's application of the balancing tests required by Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403. It underscores the importance of pretrial motions in limine for shaping trial strategy, particularly the defendant's decision on whether to testify. The decision is most significant for its innovative use of conditional rulings, justified by an appeal to FRE 102's purpose of promoting fairness and justice. This approach of crafting remedies that protect a defendant from prejudice while preventing him from gaining an unfair advantage provides a practical framework for courts managing sensitive evidentiary issues.
