United States v. Humberto Lechuga
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11106, 1993 WL 153811, 994 F.2d 346 (1993)
Rule of Law:
The mere sale of controlled substances in quantities too large for personal use, without more evidence of an agreement, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy. To prove a drug conspiracy between a seller and a buyer for resale, there must be proof of an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself, such as an agreement for the buyer to act as the seller's sales agent or distributor.
Facts:
- Government undercover agent Carr arranged to purchase 500 grams of cocaine from Evelio Pinto.
- Pinto contacted Sam Pagan to obtain the cocaine for this planned sale.
- Pagan had previously obtained cocaine from Humberto Lechuga, which Pagan then sold to Pinto.
- Pagan relayed Pinto's order for cocaine to Lechuga.
- Lechuga designated an apartment building where Pagan was to receive the cocaine for transfer to Pinto and pay Lechuga for it.
- Pagan, accompanied by Pinto and Carr, went to the building designated by Lechuga and emerged carrying two packages of cocaine.
- One package contained the 500 grams that Pinto had ordered, and the other contained 3 ounces to make up for a previous short delivery from Lechuga to Pinto via Pagan.
- As soon as Pagan handed over the packages of cocaine to Pinto, Pinto and Pagan were arrested, and Lechuga was arrested later.
Procedural Posture:
- Humberto Lechuga was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846).
- A jury convicted Lechuga on both counts in federal district court.
- The district judge sentenced Lechuga to 75 months in prison.
- Lechuga appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Seventh Circuit decided to hear the case en banc under Circuit Rule 40(f) to resolve a conflict in its cases regarding the sufficiency of evidence for drug conspiracies involving buyer-seller relationships.
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Issue:
Does the mere sale of a distribution-sized quantity of illegal drugs, with the seller knowing the buyer intends to resell, provide sufficient evidence to prove a conspiracy between the seller and buyer, or must there be additional evidence of an agreement to commit a crime beyond the sale itself?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, Circuit Judge
No, the mere sale of a distribution-sized quantity of illegal drugs, with knowledge of the buyer's intent to resell, is insufficient to prove a conspiracy between those two specific parties. However, Lechuga's conviction for conspiracy is affirmed because the evidence did establish a conspiracy between Lechuga and Pagan. The court resolved a conflict in its cases by holding that 'large quantities of controlled substances, without more, cannot sustain a conspiracy conviction.' A criminal conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a crime, but more specifically, it requires proof of an agreement to commit some crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself. A simple buyer-seller transaction, even with knowledge of the buyer's intent to resell, does not, by itself, demonstrate such a separate criminal object or a common enterprise, as the parties' interests are typically adversarial (buyer wants low price, seller wants high price). While the court found no agreement between Lechuga and Pinto that went beyond a mere sale, the indictment charged a conspiracy with 'unnamed others,' which included Pagan. The evidence showed that Pagan was acting as Lechuga's sales agent and facilitator rather than merely an arm's-length buyer. Pagan explicitly sought to 'get in some kind of [drug] deals' with Lechuga, told Lechuga he had a customer (Pinto) for a specific amount, and received an additional 3 ounces from Lechuga to make up for a previous shortage to Pinto. Pagan's testimony, including his use of 'we' when referring to the previous short delivery and the need to rectify it, indicated that Lechuga and Pagan were dealing jointly with Pinto, with Pagan serving as a sales agent. This established an agreement between Lechuga and Pagan to distribute drugs that went beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship, thereby supporting the conspiracy conviction.
Concurring - Coffey, Circuit Judge
Yes, Lechuga’s conviction for conspiracy should be affirmed based on the overwhelming evidence of a conspiracy between Lechuga and Pagan. Coffey agreed with the affirmance of Lechuga's conviction but criticized the majority's extensive discussion of the 'single-sale' question as unnecessary dicta, arguing that the court should address only issues essential to the case's resolution. He detailed additional facts supporting the Lechuga-Pagan conspiracy: their established supplier-dealer relationship dating back months, Pagan's ease in arranging transactions with Lechuga, Lechuga's dictation of the sale's logistics, and Lechuga's instruction to Pagan to 'bring the money back,' which demonstrated Lechuga's stake in the success of the distribution. The previous 'short' delivery, which 'we' (Pagan and Lechuga) had to rectify for Pinto, further evidenced a joint enterprise where Pagan served as Lechuga's middleman and general helper in the drug distribution chain. These facts, Coffey argued, clearly showed a well-run, efficient drug conspiracy between Lechuga and Pagan.
Concurring - Flaum, Circuit Judge
Yes, Lechuga’s conspiracy conviction is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. Flaum concurred with the affirmance based on the evidence of a Lechuga-Pagan conspiracy, believing it properly defers to the jury's determination of guilt. He agreed that the complex question of whether a 'single-large-sale-for-resale' constitutes a conspiracy did not need to be definitively resolved in this case, as the specific facts provided a stronger basis for conviction. Flaum noted that while the evidence for the Lechuga-Pagan conspiracy might not be 'overwhelming,' it was sufficient for a rational jury to reach a guilty verdict, and the court should not interfere with that judgment.
Concurring - Kanne, Circuit Judge
Yes, Lechuga’s conspiracy conviction should be affirmed. Kanne concurred in the affirmance but expressed disagreement with the majority's proposed 'absolute rule' that a conspiracy conviction can never be sustained solely on the basis of a single 'large quantity' drug sale. He argued that such a rule is too broad and cannot reasonably apply to extremely massive drug transactions (e.g., shiploads or thousands of kilograms) where the scale and complexity of the sale inherently imply an agreement to distribute, regardless of direct proof of prolonged cooperation. Kanne contended that a seller of extraordinarily large quantities has an inherent 'stake' in the buyer's successful distribution, and a jury should be permitted to infer conspiratorial membership from such evidence, assessing the nature of the transaction in the first instance.
Concurring - Ilana Diamond Rovner, Circuit Judge
Yes, Lechuga’s conviction is affirmed based on the sufficient evidence of a Lechuga-Pagan conspiracy. Rovner joined the portion of the majority opinion that found the evidence of a Lechuga-Pagan conspiracy sufficient to support the conviction. She agreed with the majority that the Lechuga-Pinto conspiracy could not be sustained solely on the basis of a single large quantity sale. However, she found the majority's practical guidance regarding the 'additional evidence' required to infer an agreement to distribute to be of 'limited utility' and indicated that Judge Cudahy's dissenting opinion offered more helpful insights into defining such evidence.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Cudahy, Circuit Judge
No, Lechuga’s conviction for conspiracy should be reversed due to insufficient evidence to prove an agreement to distribute cocaine beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship between Lechuga and Pagan. Cudahy concurred with the majority's implicit conclusion that a 'sale for resale alone' was insufficient to prove a conspiracy between Lechuga and Pinto, especially since Lechuga had no knowledge of Pinto's identity or distribution plans. However, he dissented from the majority's finding of a Lechuga-Pagan conspiracy, arguing that the evidence presented only an arm's-length buyer-seller relationship, where Pagan merely acted as Pinto's purchasing agent. He contended that the majority's reliance on 'snippets' of Pagan's testimony (such as Pagan's prior acquaintance with Lechuga, his use of the pronoun 'we,' and the credit sale) was insufficient to overcome the presumptive adversarial nature of a buyer-seller relationship. Cudahy emphasized that conspiracy requires a 'meeting of the minds' and an agreement to commit a crime beyond the sale itself. He contrasted the case with 'prolonged cooperation' as seen in cases like Direct Sales and highlighted examples of what would constitute 'something more' for a conspiracy, such as: the buyer acting as the seller's agent, consignment sales, standardized transactions, and evidence of trust and mutual benefit, which he felt were absent here.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified the legal standard for drug conspiracies in the Seventh Circuit, establishing that a mere sale of large quantities of drugs for resale, even with the seller's knowledge of the buyer's intent, is insufficient to constitute a conspiracy. This rejection of an automatic inference shifts the burden onto prosecutors to present additional evidence demonstrating an agreement that extends beyond the immediate buying and selling. The ruling emphasizes the need for proof of a continuing relationship, an agency role, a shared stake in the broader distribution enterprise, or other factors indicating a 'meeting of the minds' to jointly commit a crime beyond the singular act of sale. The concurring opinions highlight ongoing judicial debate regarding the precise scope of this 'something more' standard, particularly in the context of extremely large-scale drug transactions, suggesting that future cases will continue to refine what evidence is sufficient to infer conspiratorial intent in varying circumstances.
