United States v. Houlihan
871 F. Supp. 1495 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), a declarant's out-of-court statement of then-existing intent to perform a future act is admissible as circumstantial evidence that the declarant performed the intended act, even when that act involves meeting and implicates the conduct of a third party.
Facts:
- Jennierose Lynch allegedly had a loud argument with James Boyden Jr., warning him that if he did not stop selling cocaine from her corner, she would have Michael Fitzgerald kill him.
- Following this warning, James Boyden Jr. told family members that Fitzgerald had beaten him up, and they observed a bandage on his face.
- On the evening before he was found dead, James Boyden Jr. was at his sister's apartment.
- As he was leaving his sister's apartment around 8:00 PM, James Boyden Jr. told his sister, Marie Boyden Connors, that he was going out 'to meet Billy Herd.'
- In the early morning of March 2, 1992, James Boyden Jr. was found dead from a gunshot wound to the back of his head.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government brought federal charges against William 'Billy' Herd and other co-defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine requesting an order to permit the admission of certain hearsay statements made by the victim, James Boyden Jr.
- The court declined to rule on the motion before trial, opting to address evidentiary issues as they arose.
- During the trial, the government proffered the testimony of the victim's sister regarding a statement her brother made about his intent to meet defendant Herd on the night of the murder.
- The defendants made a timely objection to the admission of this statement.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) permit the admission of a deceased declarant's out-of-court statement of intent to meet a defendant as circumstantial evidence that the meeting occurred, thereby implicating the defendant in the declarant's subsequent murder?
Opinions:
Majority - Young, District Judge
Yes. A declarant's statement of intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) is admissible to prove the subsequent conduct of a third party without requiring independent corroborating evidence. The court's reasoning is rooted in a textualist interpretation of the rule. It begins by acknowledging the Supreme Court's pre-Rules precedent in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, which established that a declarant's statement of intent was admissible to prove the subsequent conduct of others. While the legislative history of Rule 803(3) is contradictory—with the Advisory Committee note leaving Hillmon 'undisturbed' and a House Committee report intending to limit it—the plain text of the rule itself contains no limitation on its use against third parties. The court notes that Congress clearly knows how to limit the admissibility of evidence, as seen in other rules like 404 and 407, but chose not to do so here. The court explicitly rejects the approach of the Second and Fourth Circuits, which require independent corroboration, as 'judicial policymaking' without foundation in the rule's text. Instead, it adopts the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Pheaster, holding that any potential unreliability of the statement goes to its weight, which is a matter for the jury to decide, not a basis for its exclusion.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a significant circuit split on the interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). By aligning with the Ninth Circuit's broad, text-based interpretation of the Hillmon doctrine, the court rejects the more cautious approach of the Second and Fourth Circuits that requires corroborating evidence. This ruling expands the utility of the state-of-mind exception for prosecutors, allowing them to introduce a victim's statement of intent as powerful circumstantial evidence linking a defendant to a crime scene or a meeting. Consequently, it places a greater burden on criminal defendants to rebut the inference that such a meeting occurred, based solely on the out-of-court statement of a declarant who cannot be cross-examined.
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