United States v. Homer Foye Gunter
546 F.2d 861 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
Consent to a warrantless search by a third party is valid under the Fourth Amendment if that party possesses common authority over or a sufficient relationship to the premises, which rests on mutual use and joint access or control for most purposes, rather than on technical property rights.
Facts:
- After stealing approximately 240 tires and tubes from a Santa Fe box car, Lawrence Alan DuPont and other defendants transported them to a barn.
- About a week later, at the suggestion of defendant Robert Haynes and using Haynes's money, DuPont rented a mini-warehouse storage unit under the fictitious name 'George Lloyd Haney'.
- DuPont purchased a padlock, locked the storage unit, and gave the keys to Haynes.
- Subsequently, DuPont obtained the keys from Haynes and, with defendant Michael Eugene Lamb, moved many of the stolen tires from the barn to the mini-warehouse.
- DuPont returned the keys to Haynes after placing the tires in the unit.
- On another occasion, DuPont again obtained the keys from Haynes to enter the mini-warehouse and retrieve two tires for his personal use, returning the keys to Haynes afterward.
- Following his arrest, DuPont gave voluntary consent to FBI agents to search the mini-warehouse.
Procedural Posture:
- Homer Foye Gunter and several co-defendants were charged in a federal indictment with theft from an interstate shipment and conspiracy.
- The first trial of the defendants ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict (a hung jury).
- A second trial was held, which resulted in the conviction of two defendants but ended in another mistrial for the remaining six defendants due to a second hung jury.
- After the second mistrial, the defendants' motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of double jeopardy was summarily denied by the trial court.
- At a third trial, the remaining six defendants were convicted by a jury on both counts.
- Seven convicted defendants, including Gunter, appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a co-conspirator who rents a storage unit, places a lock on it, gives the keys to another conspirator, but subsequently retrieves the keys to access the unit on multiple occasions, possess sufficient 'common authority' to validly consent to a warrantless search of the unit?
Opinions:
Majority - McWilliams, Circuit Judge.
Yes. A co-conspirator who rents, uses, and repeatedly accesses a shared storage space has sufficient common authority to consent to its search, even if another person holds the keys at that moment. The court reasoned that the validity of third-party consent does not depend on property law but on the practical realities of the relationship to the premises. Citing United States v. Matlock, the court applied the 'common authority' test, which looks for 'mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.' Here, DuPont rented the unit, placed the lock, physically moved the stolen goods into it, and accessed it on multiple occasions. These actions demonstrated a sufficient relationship and joint control, meaning DuPont could validly consent to the search in his own right, and the other defendants had 'assumed the risk' that he might do so. The court also rejected the defendants' double jeopardy claim, holding that a third trial following two mistrials due to hung juries does not violate the Fifth Amendment where, as here, the mistrials were declared out of 'manifest necessity' and the trial judge did not abuse their discretion. A hung jury is the classic example justifying a mistrial and subsequent retrial.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the flexible, fact-based 'common authority' standard for third-party consent searches established in United States v. Matlock. It clarifies that indicators of practical use and access, such as renting a space and placing items within it, are more determinative of authority than formal arrangements or temporary physical possession of keys. This pragmatic approach prevents defendants from defeating a valid consent search through technicalities about who was holding the key. Furthermore, the opinion affirms that the double jeopardy clause does not create a per se bar to a specific number of retrials after hung juries, preserving prosecutorial power to pursue a conviction so long as each mistrial was a matter of 'manifest necessity' and not a result of judicial abuse.
