United States v. Hines
55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 257, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9306 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Daubert/Kumho framework, expert testimony in a technical field that lacks scientific validation, such as handwriting analysis, is admissible to describe similarities and dissimilarities between known and questioned items, but is not admissible to offer an ultimate conclusion on authorship.
Facts:
- Johannes Hines was charged with robbing the Broadway National Bank in Chelsea, Massachusetts on January 27, 1997.
- The robber passed a handwritten "stick-up" note to the bank teller, Ms. Jeanne Dunne.
- Ms. Dunne, a white woman, gave a generic description of the robber as a Black man with dark skin, a wide nose, and a medium build.
- Shortly after the robbery, Dunne was unable to identify the perpetrator from a book of photographs of African American men.
- After helping a police artist create a sketch, Dunne was shown an eight-photograph array including a picture of Hines.
- Dunne stated that Hines' photograph "resembled" the robber and "looked like him," but she was still not sure.
- Several months later, Dunne identified Hines in a police lineup.
Procedural Posture:
- Johannes Hines was charged with bank robbery in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- Hines's first trial ended in a hung jury.
- In advance of a second trial, the government gave notice of its intent to call an FBI document examiner, Diana Harrison, as a handwriting analysis expert.
- The defendant, Hines, filed a motion in limine to exclude the government's handwriting expert testimony, arguing it failed the reliability standards of Daubert and Kumho.
- Hines also moved to admit the testimony of Dr. Saul Kassin, an expert on the psychology of eyewitness identification.
- The government opposed Hines's expert and sought to exclude Dr. Kassin's testimony.
- The district court conducted a Daubert/Kumho hearing regarding the admissibility of the handwriting analysis expert.
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Issue:
Does expert testimony from a handwriting analyst, which includes an ultimate conclusion on the authorship of a document, satisfy the reliability requirements for admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert/Kumho framework?
Opinions:
Majority - Gertner, District Judge.
No. Expert testimony from a handwriting analyst offering an ultimate conclusion on authorship does not satisfy the reliability requirements for admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. While an expert may testify about the similarities and differences observed between writing samples to assist the jury, the field of handwriting analysis lacks the scientific validation, peer review by a disinterested community, and known error rates necessary to support a definitive conclusion about who wrote a particular document. The court's gatekeeping function under Daubert and Kumho requires it to scrutinize even venerable, non-scientific fields. Allowing an expert to testify to observations assists the jury in its own comparison, which it is capable of evaluating. However, permitting a final conclusion of authorship lends an unearned 'patina' of scientific certainty to a subjective process, which would be unduly prejudicial and exceeds the limits of the expert's reliable knowledge. The court contrasted this with expert testimony on the psychology of eyewitness identification, which it found admissible because it is based on extensive, peer-reviewed scientific studies and can assist the jury by providing information on factors affecting memory that are beyond a layperson's common knowledge.
Analysis:
This memorandum and order is a significant early application of Kumho Tire's extension of Daubert to non-scientific, technical fields. By creating a 'middle ground' for handwriting analysis—admitting testimony about similarities but excluding ultimate conclusions—the decision established an influential model for handling forensic evidence that lacks a strong scientific foundation. This approach forces experts to confine their testimony to their direct observations, preventing them from overstating their certainty and usurping the jury's role as the ultimate finder of fact. The case highlights a crucial distinction in evidentiary gatekeeping: scrutinizing the scientific claims of long-accepted forensic disciplines while recognizing the value of scientifically-validated social science, like the psychology of eyewitness testimony, in assisting the jury.
