United States v. Hershel D. Murvine
743 F.2d 511 (1984)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A trial court has wide discretion in scheduling a trial, and its decisions will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion. Such an abuse requires clear evidence that the schedule unfairly compressed the defense or was coercive to the jury.
Facts:
- On February 23, 1982, five coils of stainless steel were stolen from a truck in Hammond, Indiana.
- William Kramer acquired the stolen coils and, at the defendant's instruction, shipped them to a plant near Chicago, Illinois.
- On March 22, 1982, the defendant sold the coils to Theodore Salmon, who became suspicious and notified the FBI.
- After being questioned by the FBI, Kramer agreed to cooperate as a confidential informant.
- In June 1982, Kramer engaged in another sale of three stolen steel coils from Toledo, Ohio, again with the defendant's involvement.
- The defendant directed Kramer to have these coils shipped to a Chicago warehouse.
- The defendant, with assistance from James Magnus, arranged the sale of the second set of coils to Envoy Stainless Steel Company.
- On July 14, 1982, the defendant used the alias 'Robert Martin' when he met with an Envoy representative and received payment for the stolen coils.
Procedural Posture:
- On March 18, 1983, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant and a co-conspirator, James Magnus.
- The defendant was charged in the U.S. District Court with conspiracy, possession, and interstate transportation of stolen goods.
- On July 18, 1983, the first day of trial, the district court granted a severance, and the defendant's trial proceeded alone.
- On July 22, 1983, following a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty on all counts.
- The defendant appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing the trial schedule deprived him of a fair trial.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court's decision to conduct a long final day of trial and have the jury begin deliberations at 9:30 p.m. on a Friday constitute a manifest abuse of discretion that deprives the defendant of a fair trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Flaum, Circuit Judge
No, the trial court's scheduling of the trial does not constitute a manifest abuse of discretion. A trial court possesses wide discretion in managing its schedule, and a conviction will not be reversed on such grounds without a clear showing of prejudice to the defense or coercion of the jury. Here, the record does not demonstrate that the defense was unfairly compressed, as counsel had ample opportunity for cross-examination over the five-day trial. The defendant’s objection to his own fatigue was contradicted by the trial judge's direct observation that he was testifying coherently. Similarly, there is no clear evidence that the jury was coerced. Although beginning deliberations late on a Friday is not encouraged, the jury was provided supper, the case was not overly complex, and there was no indication of exhaustion or confusion that would render their verdict suspect. The court's failure to poll the jury, while inadvisable, did not rise to the level of reversible error under these circumstances.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high degree of deference appellate courts give to a trial court's management of its docket and trial schedule. It establishes that a demanding schedule, including late-night sessions, is not per se prejudicial or coercive. The ruling clarifies that a defendant challenging a trial schedule must point to specific, demonstrable prejudice in the record, rather than merely the inconvenience or length of the proceedings. While the court's opinion expresses disapproval of the trial judge's refusal to poll the jury, it distinguishes between best practices and reversible error, signaling to future courts that such a poll is advisable but not constitutionally required.
