United States v. Heredia
483 F.3d 913 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's 'knowledge' of a fact required by a criminal statute may be satisfied by a showing of willful blindness, which requires proof that the defendant (1) was aware of a high probability of the fact's existence and (2) took deliberate actions to avoid learning the truth. A trial court's decision to give a willful blindness jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo.
Facts:
- Carmen Heredia accompanied her mother on a bus trip from Tucson to Nogales, where her mother had a dentist's appointment.
- After the appointment, Heredia borrowed her Aunt Belia's car to transport her mother back to Tucson.
- While preparing for the trip, Heredia noticed a strong 'detergent' smell in the car; her Aunt Belia claimed to have spilled fabric softener, an explanation Heredia found incredible.
- During the drive to Tucson, Heredia's mother was visibly nervous and carried a large amount of cash, which Heredia admitted made her suspect there might be drugs in the car.
- Heredia claimed her suspicions were not fully aroused until after she had passed the last freeway exit before an inland Border Patrol checkpoint.
- At the checkpoint, a border agent noticed a 'very strong perfume odor' emanating from the vehicle.
- A search of the car's trunk revealed 349.2 pounds of marijuana surrounded by dryer sheets.
Procedural Posture:
- Carmen Heredia was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona (a federal trial court) with possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
- At trial, the government requested a 'deliberate ignorance' jury instruction.
- Over Heredia's objection, the district court judge gave the instruction to the jury.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Heredia was convicted.
- Heredia (as appellant) appealed her conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the deliberate ignorance instruction was improper.
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Issue:
Does a 'deliberate ignorance' or 'willful blindness' jury instruction, used to satisfy the 'knowingly' element of a crime, require a finding that the defendant's motive for avoiding the truth was to create a defense for a potential prosecution?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Kozinski
No. A deliberate ignorance instruction is proper if it requires the jury to find only that the defendant was aware of a high probability of criminality and deliberately avoided learning the truth. The instruction does not need to include a third prong requiring that the defendant's motive for avoiding the truth was to create a defense in the event of prosecution. The court affirmed its precedent in United States v. Jewell, holding that 'knowingly' in a criminal statute includes willful blindness. It overruled a line of cases that had added a 'motive' prong, reasoning that the requirement of a 'deliberate' action to avoid the truth sufficiently protects defendants who fail to investigate for innocent reasons, such as safety concerns. Furthermore, the court changed the standard of review for a district court's decision to give a deliberate ignorance instruction from de novo to the more deferential 'abuse of discretion' standard.
Concurring - Judge Kleinfeld
Yes. To be constitutionally sound and avoid convicting innocent individuals, a willful blindness instruction must require the jury to find that the defendant's motive for avoiding confirmation of their suspicions was to be able to deny knowledge and avoid criminal responsibility if apprehended. Without this motive element, the instruction improperly criminalizes conduct that may be merely negligent or reckless, such as a FedEx driver who does not inspect every package. However, Judge Kleinfeld concurred in affirming the conviction because Heredia's attorney did not specifically object to the instruction's lack of a motive element at trial, meaning the instruction was subject to the 'plain error' standard of review, which it did not meet under the circuit's current law.
Dissenting - Judge Graber
No, because the entire concept of a 'deliberate ignorance' instruction is an improper judicial creation that lowers the statutory mens rea requirement from 'knowingly' to something less. The plain text of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires that a defendant act 'knowingly or intentionally.' Willful blindness is a distinct, lesser mental state. The dissent argues that when Congress wishes to criminalize conduct based on a lower mental state, such as 'having reasonable cause to believe,' it does so explicitly. By allowing the 'Jewell' instruction, the court is improperly engaging in the legislative function of defining a crime. The dissent would overrule 'Jewell' entirely and require the prosecution to prove actual knowledge as stated in the statute.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and simplifies the deliberate ignorance doctrine in the Ninth Circuit, resolving an internal split by definitively rejecting the 'motive prong.' This makes it easier for prosecutors to obtain convictions on a willful blindness theory, as they no longer need to prove a defendant's specific reason for avoiding the truth. The shift in the standard of review from de novo to abuse of discretion gives trial judges significantly more deference in deciding whether the evidence warrants the instruction, likely leading to it being given more frequently. The ruling solidifies the willful blindness doctrine as a powerful tool for the government in cases where direct proof of a defendant's actual knowledge is difficult to obtain.
