United States v. Henthorn
864 F.3d 1241, 103 Fed. R. Serv. 1325, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13498 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of prior similar acts is admissible for non-propensity purposes, such as proving intent, plan, or lack of accident, particularly when the prior acts are strikingly similar to the charged offense and rebut a defendant's claim of accident through a 'logic of improbability.' The probative value of this evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Facts:
- In May 1995, Harold Henthorn's first wife, Lynn, was crushed to death by their car in a remote location while they were supposedly changing a tire. Henthorn collected approximately $600,000 in life insurance proceeds from her death.
- In May 2011, Henthorn's second wife, Toni, was struck in the neck by a heavy wooden beam that Henthorn threw off a deck at their remote vacation cabin, causing a significant injury.
- Prior to Toni's death, Henthorn had taken out several large life insurance policies on her life, totaling over $4.5 million, and had recently made himself the beneficiary of an annuity originally intended for their daughter.
- In September 2012, during a hike celebrating their twelfth anniversary, Toni fell more than 100 feet from a cliff to her death in a remote area of Rocky Mountain National Park. Henthorn was the only witness.
- After Toni's fall, Henthorn gave inconsistent accounts to investigators and 911 dispatchers. A map was found in Henthorn's car with the location of the fall marked with a pink 'X'.
- Physical evidence at the scene and on Toni's body contradicted Henthorn's claims that he performed CPR, as her lipstick was not smeared and she lacked injuries typically associated with resuscitation efforts.
Procedural Posture:
- Harold Henthorn was charged in U.S. District Court (a federal trial court) with the first-degree murder of his wife, Toni.
- Before trial, the government gave notice of its intent to introduce evidence regarding the death of Henthorn’s first wife and a prior injury to Toni under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
- Henthorn filed a motion in limine to exclude this evidence, arguing it was improper character evidence and unfairly prejudicial.
- After a two-day hearing, the district court granted in part and denied in part, ruling that evidence of the two prior incidents involving his wives was admissible for the limited purpose of proving plan, intent, and lack of accident.
- Following a jury trial where this evidence was presented, Henthorn was convicted of first-degree murder.
- Henthorn (as appellant) appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing the district court abused its discretion by admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence.
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Issue:
Does the admission of evidence of prior suspicious incidents, including the death of the defendant's first wife, violate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) when offered to prove intent, plan, and lack of accident in the defendant's murder trial for his second wife?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Tymkovich
No. The admission of evidence of prior suspicious incidents does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) when used for a proper, non-propensity purpose such as rebutting a defense of accident. The court applied the four-part Huddleston test and found the evidence admissible. First, it was offered for a proper purpose: to prove intent, plan, and lack of accident, which are explicitly permitted under Rule 404(b)(2). Second, the evidence was highly relevant due to the 'extraordinarily similar' circumstances of the incidents: each occurred in a remote location with Henthorn as the sole witness, involved inconsistent stories from him, and was preceded by his acquisition of large life insurance policies. Third, while prejudicial, the evidence was not unfairly so, as its high probative value in rebutting the accident defense was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Finally, the district court provided proper limiting instructions to the jury, directing them to consider the evidence only for its permissible purpose. The court reasoned that the 'logic of improbability' makes it less likely that the defendant lacked the requisite intent when multiple, similar, tragic events have occurred.
Analysis:
This decision strongly affirms the use of the 'lack of accident' and 'intent' exceptions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), particularly in cases built on circumstantial evidence where the defendant claims happenstance. It demonstrates that even temporally remote prior acts (17 years in this case) can be deemed highly probative if they share a unique and striking similarity with the charged offense. The court's reliance on the 'doctrine of chances' or 'logic of improbability' provides a significant precedent for prosecutors, allowing them to introduce a pattern of suspicious 'accidents' to argue that the current event was, in fact, an intentional criminal act. This narrows the protection against propensity evidence where a defendant repeatedly claims to be the victim of tragic coincidences.
