United States v. Henry
447 U.S. 264 (1980)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The government violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it intentionally creates a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel by using a paid jailhouse informant who acts as an undisclosed government agent.
Facts:
- In August 1972, the Janaf Branch of the United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National in Norfolk, Va., was robbed by two masked men.
- A rent receipt found in the getaway car led government agents to arrest Billy Gale Henry for the robbery in November 1972.
- After Henry was indicted and incarcerated in the Norfolk city jail, government agents contacted another inmate, Nichols, who had previously served as a paid informant for the FBI.
- Nichols was housed in the same cellblock as Henry.
- An FBI agent instructed Nichols to be alert to any statements made by federal prisoners, including Henry, but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry about the bank robbery.
- Nichols engaged in conversations with Henry, during which Henry made incriminating statements about his involvement in the robbery.
- Nichols was paid by the government for providing this information.
Procedural Posture:
- Billy Gale Henry was indicted for armed robbery in the United States District Court and counsel was appointed.
- At trial, a government informant, Nichols, testified about incriminating statements Henry made to him in jail, and Henry was convicted.
- Henry's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- Henry later filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the District Court, arguing for the first time that the use of Nichols' testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
- The District Court denied the motion without a hearing.
- The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary inquiry.
- On remand, after reviewing government affidavits, the District Court again denied the motion.
- The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the government's actions violated Henry's Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah v. United States.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the government violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by using a paid, undercover jailhouse informant to obtain incriminating statements from the defendant after he has been indicted and is in custody?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
Yes. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The holding in Massiah v. United States, which prohibits federal agents from deliberately eliciting incriminating words from a defendant after indictment, applies here. The court identified three important factors: First, Nichols was not a passive listener but a paid government informant acting under instructions. Second, Nichols' status as a fellow inmate was a deception that prevented Henry from knowing he was speaking to a government agent, thus Henry cannot be held to have waived his right to counsel. Third, Henry's incarceration created subtle pressures that made him more susceptible to the ploys of an undercover agent. The government must have known that placing a paid informant in such close proximity to an indicted defendant was likely to lead to incriminating statements.
Concurring - Justice Powell
Yes. The record adequately demonstrates a Sixth Amendment violation because the informant deliberately elicited incriminating information. The rule of Massiah prevents police interference with the relationship between a suspect and his counsel once formal proceedings have begun. However, Massiah is not violated by the mere presence of a passive informant in a jail cell who only overhears spontaneous statements. To demonstrate a violation, a defendant must show that the government engaged in conduct that is the functional equivalent of interrogation. Because the informant's actions in this case constituted deliberate elicitation, the Sixth Amendment was violated.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
No. The Court forges a new "likely to induce" test that departs from Massiah's requirement that an agent must have "deliberately elicited" the statements, which implies specific intent. The FBI agent specifically instructed Nichols not to question Henry, showing an intent not to elicit statements. The majority misapplies its own new test by relying on dubious factors like the contingent-fee arrangement and Henry's incarceration. The government's conduct was not culpable, and Henry's statements were voluntary; therefore, the evidence should not be excluded.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Court's ruling rests on a prophylactic application of the Sixth Amendment that ignores its doctrinal foundation, which is to provide a layman with legal expertise and aid in formal proceedings. Massiah itself was a substantial departure from the traditional concerns of the Sixth Amendment because Henry was not prevented from consulting his counsel, nor was trial preparation obstructed. An accused who voluntarily relinquishes his rights by talking to someone he mistakenly trusts is accountable for his actions. The Sixth Amendment does not create a right for an attorney to be a "guru" present whenever an accused is inclined to reveal incriminating information.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the Massiah doctrine. The Court moved from a standard requiring the government to have "deliberately elicited" statements to a more objective standard focusing on whether the government "intentionally created a situation likely to induce" them. This holding makes it more difficult for the government to use undercover informants to gather information from indicted defendants in custody. It shifted the inquiry from the informant's specific actions (e.g., direct questioning) to the overall government-created environment and its likely effect on the defendant.
