United States v. Heng Awkak Roman
356 F. Supp. 434, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14446 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
Factual impossibility is not a defense to a charge of attempt, particularly when a defendant's actions would constitute the completed crime if the attendant circumstances were as the defendant believed them to be.
Facts:
- On November 7, 1972, John T. Smith, an informer, met with Heng Roman (Heng) and Lee Koo (Koo) at the Strand Hotel in Singapore to discuss the importation and sale of significant quantities of narcotics in the United States.
- Around November 12-13, Heng and Koo picked up Smith’s suitcase, and the following evening, at Heng’s house, showed Smith that it contained 2.5 kilograms of white powder, which Heng stated was heroin.
- The next day, Heng drove Smith to the airport with the suitcase containing the supposed heroin in the car's trunk.
- At the airport, Smith, unbeknownst to Heng, gave the suitcase to an agent of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), who removed the heroin and kept it in law enforcement custody; Smith then flew to New York.
- On November 20, 1972, after arriving in New York, Smith retrieved the suitcase, now filled with soap powder, from the BNDD office and placed it in a locker in Pennsylvania Station.
- Later that evening, as prearranged in Singapore, Smith met Heng and Koo at the Hotel McAlpin in Manhattan and showed Heng the key to the locker.
- On November 20-21, Heng and Koo offered to sell the supposed 2.5 kilograms of heroin to BNDD agents posing as buyers.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendants Heng Roman and Lee Koo were charged in a two-count indictment in the Southern District of New York: Count I for conspiracy to violate narcotics laws (21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963) and Count II for possession of 2.5 kilograms of heroin with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)).
- The defendants were tried without a jury before District Judge Frederick van Pelt Bryan.
- At the conclusion of the four-day trial, Judge Bryan found both defendants guilty on the conspiracy count (Count I) and reserved decision on the substantive possession count (Count II).
- Both sides subsequently filed post-trial briefs concerning Count II.
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Issue:
Does factual impossibility, where the completion of a crime is impossible due to circumstances unknown to the defendant, serve as a defense to a charge of attempt?
Opinions:
Majority - Frederick van Pelt Bryan, District Judge
No, factual impossibility does not serve as a defense to a charge of attempt when the defendant's conduct would have constituted the completed crime if the circumstances were as they believed them to be. The court found that while Heng and Koo did not have actual or constructive possession of heroin in New York due to its prior removal by the BNDD, their actions demonstrated the requisite intent and steps towards possession. The court distinguished between factual impossibility, where the objective is criminal but external circumstances prevent its completion (which is not a defense), and legal impossibility, where the actor's goal is not actually criminal (which is a defense). Since the defendants’ objective was criminal (possession with intent to distribute heroin) and they acted under the belief that the heroin was in the suitcase, their actions constituted an attempt, regardless of the fact that the actual heroin was not present. The court also dismissed the argument that their conduct was not sufficiently proximate to the completed crime, stating that this test does not apply when the conduct would have constituted the completed crime if the circumstances were as believed.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the scope of the impossibility defense in criminal attempt law, particularly in the federal context where no comprehensive statutory definition of attempt exists. By firmly rejecting factual impossibility as a defense, the court emphasized the importance of a defendant's criminal intent and substantial steps taken towards the crime, even if unknown circumstances render completion impossible. This interpretation aligns federal law with the Model Penal Code and various state laws, providing a consistent framework for prosecuting inchoate crimes. It signifies that individuals cannot escape liability for attempt simply because their plan was foiled by external factors beyond their control or knowledge.
