United States v. Hearst
1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14496, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 53 A.L.R. Fed. 110 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant who fails to raise a constitutional claim, such as prejudicial pretrial publicity, at trial or on direct appeal has waived that claim for purposes of a collateral attack on the conviction, unless they can demonstrate both good cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation.
Facts:
- On February 4, 1974, Patricia Campbell Hearst was kidnapped at gunpoint from her apartment in Berkeley, California by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA).
- Two months later, Hearst announced in a taped message that she had repudiated her former life and had joined the SLA to "stay and fight."
- On April 15, 1974, Hearst, wielding a sawed-off carbine, participated in an armed robbery of the Hibernia Bank in San Francisco.
- Subsequently, Hearst fired an automatic weapon at a sporting goods store in Los Angeles to cover the escape of her SLA companions during a shoplifting incident.
- Hearst remained a fugitive for fourteen months until she was apprehended in San Francisco on September 18, 1975.
- Upon her arrest, Hearst stated her occupation was "urban guerrilla," and SLA documents, partly in her handwriting describing her reasons for joining, were found in her apartment.
- While held in pretrial detention, a conversation between Hearst and a childhood friend, Patricia Tobin, was monitored and recorded by jail authorities.
Procedural Posture:
- Patricia Hearst was indicted by a federal grand jury for armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)(d)) and using a firearm to commit a felony (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- At her trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Hearst raised the defense of coercion.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.
- The district court sentenced Hearst to seven years on the robbery count and a concurrent two years on the firearm count.
- Hearst's two subsequent motions for a new trial were denied by the district court.
- Hearst (appellant) appealed her conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Supreme Court of the United States denied Hearst's petition for a writ of certiorari.
- Represented by new counsel, Hearst filed a motion in the U.S. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence.
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Issue:
Does a defendant waive their right to challenge their conviction on grounds of prejudicial pretrial publicity in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 when they made a deliberate, tactical decision not to move for a change of venue before trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Orrick, District Judge
Yes. A defendant waives the right to challenge a conviction on grounds of prejudicial pretrial publicity in a collateral proceeding when they make a deliberate, tactical decision not to raise the issue before trial. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b), failure to raise objections to the institution of criminal proceedings before trial constitutes a waiver. Citing Davis v. United States and Wainwright v. Sykes, the court explained that to overcome this waiver in a collateral attack, a petitioner must show 'good cause' for the failure and 'actual prejudice.' The court found that Hearst's counsel made a 'considered, tactical decision' not to move for a change of venue, explicitly stating a preference to address potential prejudice through voir dire. Such a strategic choice does not constitute 'good cause.' Furthermore, Hearst failed to demonstrate 'actual prejudice,' as the nationwide publicity of her case made it unlikely any other jurisdiction would have been substantially less informed. The court also dismissed Hearst's other claims, finding that her Fourth Amendment challenge to the recorded jailhouse conversation was barred under Stone v. Powell because it had been fully and fairly litigated, and her ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed because counsel's performance was vigorous and tactical decisions were reasonable.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the principle of finality in criminal convictions by strictly applying the 'cause and prejudice' standard for overcoming procedural default on collateral review. It clarifies that a deliberate tactical decision by counsel, even one that proves unsuccessful, does not constitute 'cause' to excuse a waiver, thereby limiting a defendant's ability to get a 'second bite at the apple' on post-conviction review. The opinion also confirms the application of the Stone v. Powell rule to § 2255 motions by federal prisoners, precluding the relitigation of Fourth Amendment claims already fully heard on direct review. This case serves as a key example for law students on the importance of raising all potential constitutional objections at the earliest appropriate stage of litigation.
