United States v. Hearst
563 F.2d 1331 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's subsequent criminal acts is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to rebut a defense of duress by showing intent and state of mind, even if the acts are dissimilar to the charged crime. A defendant who testifies on their own behalf waives the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for all matters reasonably related to the subject of their direct testimony.
Facts:
- Patricia Hearst participated in an armed robbery of a San Francisco bank with members of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA).
- At her trial for the robbery, Hearst raised the defense of duress, claiming the SLA had kidnapped her and compelled her to participate.
- Approximately one month after the bank robbery, Hearst was involved in other criminal incidents in Los Angeles with William and Emily Harris, who were also members of the SLA.
- In one Los Angeles incident, Hearst discharged an automatic rifle at a sporting goods store, enabling William Harris to escape after a shoplifting attempt.
- On the same day, Hearst, along with the Harrises, stole a van and kidnapped its owner, Thomas Matthews.
- During the kidnapping, Matthews later testified that Hearst had an opportunity to escape or signal for help but did not do so.
Procedural Posture:
- Patricia Hearst was charged in a two-count indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (a federal trial court) with armed bank robbery.
- At trial, Hearst raised the defense of duress.
- A jury found Hearst guilty on both counts.
- The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Hearst to prison.
- Hearst (as appellant) appealed her conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) permit the admission of a defendant's subsequent criminal acts to rebut a duress defense, even if those acts are dissimilar to the charged crime and introduced during the prosecution's case-in-chief?
Opinions:
Per Curiam - The Court
Yes, the admission of the subsequent criminal acts was permissible to rebut the defendant's duress defense. While Rule 404(b) forbids using other crimes to prove a defendant's criminal propensity, the evidence here was admitted for a different, permissible purpose: to prove Hearst's intent and state of mind, thereby rebutting her claim of duress. The court reasoned that evidence of her willing participation in subsequent crimes with the same group was highly probative of whether she was acting under duress during the earlier bank robbery. The court rejected the argument that the subsequent crimes must be similar, stating that similarity is only required when it is the basis for relevance; here, the relevance stemmed from the circumstances showing a lack of coercion. Although introducing this evidence in the government's case-in-chief might have been a procedural error, it was harmless because Hearst had already announced her duress defense, meaning the evidence would have been admitted later in rebuttal anyway. The court also held that by testifying about being a victim of coercion for the entire period from her kidnapping to her arrest, Hearst waived her Fifth Amendment privilege for all reasonably related matters, including a 'lost year' she intentionally omitted from her testimony. Finally, the court found no Fourth or Sixth Amendment violations in the recording and use of a jailhouse conversation, as it was done for prison security and did not involve government interrogation.
Analysis:
This case solidifies an 'inclusionary' interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), allowing evidence of other bad acts for any purpose other than proving criminal character, such as rebutting a specific defense. It clarifies that the similarity of other acts is not a rigid requirement, but depends on the specific theory of relevance. The decision also significantly defines the scope of a testifying defendant's Fifth Amendment waiver, establishing that a defendant cannot offer a selective narrative and then use the privilege to shield reasonably related, unfavorable facts from cross-examination, thereby preventing the privilege from being used as both a sword and a shield.
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