United States v. Havens
446 U.S. 620 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, while inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, may be used to impeach a defendant's false statements made in response to proper cross-examination that is reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct testimony.
Facts:
- John McLeroth and respondent Havens, both attorneys, boarded a flight from Lima, Peru, to Miami, Florida.
- In Miami, a customs officer searched McLeroth and discovered cocaine sewn into makeshift pockets in a T-shirt he was wearing.
- McLeroth implicated Havens, who had already cleared customs.
- Havens was arrested, and his luggage was seized and searched without a warrant.
- Inside Havens' luggage, officers found a T-shirt from which pieces had been cut that precisely matched the pieces sewn onto McLeroth’s T-shirt.
Procedural Posture:
- Havens was charged with federal drug offenses in a three-count indictment.
- Before trial, the district court granted Havens's motion to suppress the illegally seized T-shirt.
- At a jury trial in federal district court, Havens was convicted.
- Havens, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that illegally seized evidence could not be used to impeach statements first made on cross-examination.
- The United States, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule bar the government from using illegally seized evidence to impeach a defendant's false statements made in response to proper cross-examination, where the statements were not made during direct examination?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No. The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not bar the use of illegally seized evidence to impeach a defendant's statements made during a proper cross-examination that is reasonably suggested by the direct testimony. The Court reasoned that the fundamental goal of the legal system is to arrive at the truth, and a defendant's constitutional shield against illegally seized evidence cannot be 'perverted into a license to use perjury.' Extending the impeachment exception from cases like Walder and Harris, the Court found no constitutional difference between impeaching statements made on direct examination and those made on cross-examination, as long as the cross-examination is properly within the scope of the direct testimony. The deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is sufficiently served by prohibiting the use of tainted evidence in the government's case-in-chief, and this interest does not outweigh the need to prevent false testimony from going unchallenged.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should bar the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach testimony first elicited by the government on cross-examination. This decision improperly departs from the precedent set in Agnello v. United States, which held that the government cannot 'smuggle in' tainted evidence by baiting a defendant on cross-examination. The majority's 'reasonably suggested' standard gives prosecutors too much power to lay a predicate for admitting otherwise suppressible evidence. This ruling forces defendants to choose between their constitutional right to testify and their right not to be convicted on the basis of illegally seized evidence, thereby undermining fundamental constitutional protections.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the impeachment exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. Previously, under cases like Walder v. United States, the exception was understood to apply only to false statements made by a defendant during direct examination. United States v. Havens erases the bright-line distinction between direct and cross-examination, establishing a more flexible but less predictable standard: whether the cross-examination was 'reasonably suggested' by the direct testimony. This ruling increases the strategic risk for defendants who choose to testify, as even a general denial on direct examination may 'open the door' to impeachment with suppressed evidence on a wide range of related subjects.
